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1 Introduction
In this paper we face the problem of designing a quantitative methodology that may be
applied to valuation of trades occuring under central counterparties (CCP) clearing or via
a bilateral Credit Support Annex (CSA). A crucial element of this analysis is the inclusion
of the relevant risks affecting the trades besides their standard market risks, namely credit
risk, wrong way risk and collateral gap risk, initial and variation margins, funding costs and
default modeling. While this paper focuses on the analysis at deal level of a specific market
player, namely what we could call the micro view, the onset of CCPs is a relevant issue also
from the systemic / macro point of view. In this respect, it is appropriate to mention that
in the large scale space the Tabb Group estimated extra collateral requirements following the
full onset of CCPs to hit a level of 2 $ Trillion, see Rhode [2011]. This figure is enormous
and has important systemic liquidity implications. A survey paper, reporting a dialogue on
valuation under CSA and CCPs that could be a good informal introduction to this more
technical paper is available in Brigo and Pallavicini [2013].
The context for this paper contribution is the following. Starting from summer 2007, with
the spreading of the credit crunch, market quotes of forward rates and zero-coupon bonds
began to violate standard no-arbitrage relationships. This was partly due to the liquidity crisis
affecting credit lines, and to the possibility of a systemic break-down triggered by increased
counterparty credit risk. Indeed, credit risk is only one facet of the problem, since the crisis
started as a funding liquidity crisis, as shown for example by Eisenschmidt and Tapking
[2009], and it continued as a credit crisis following a typical spiral pattern as described in
Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009].
This has been the most dramatic signal for the inadequacy of standard financial modelling
based on idealized assumptions on risk-free rates, idealized credit risk and on unrestricted
access to funding instruments. Removing or relaxing such assumptions opens the door to fi-
nancial models able to analyze the inner mechanics of a deal: collateral rules, funding policies,
close-out procedures, market fees, among others. Such features require to be included in any
realistic pricing framework and open a variety of quantitative and infrastructure challenges
at an unprecedented level of difficulty.
A few papers in the financial literature have tried either to re-define the theory from scratch
or to extend the standard framework to the new world. The works of Cre´pey [2011, 2012a,b]
open the path towards a pricing theory based on different bank accounts, accruing at different
rates, and representing the different cash sources one may have at her disposal to implement
the hedging strategies, the funding policies and the margining rules. We cite also the partial
works by Piterbarg [2010, 2012] (no default risk), focusing on perfectly collateralized deals
and trying to reformulate the basic Black-Scholes theory, and the works of Burgard and
Kjaer [2011a,b] (no collateral). On the other hand, the works of Pallavicini et al. [2011,
2012] stress the fact that all updated features can be included in terms of modified payoffs
rather than through the need of a new and somehow ad-hoc pricing theory. In particular, the
authors recognize that a financial contract must include hedging, funding and margining fees
as specific and precisely defined additional cash flows.
As a direct consequence of these approaches, the price of a derivative contract depends
• on several choices the investor and the counterparty adopt for the collateralization
procedure, either a bilateral Credit Support Annex (CSA) or the interposing action of
a Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP),
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• on the particular hedging strategy, which in turn may use collateralized instruments,
• and on the funding policy of the Treasury department that manages the collateral assets
and the cash needed by the traders to fund their hedge.
In more formal terms we can say that the pricing measure is now depending on the
derivative contract itself, as shown in Pallavicini et al. [2012], and we lose the notion of a
risk-free rate. A similar result can be found also in Bielecki and Rutkowski [2013] in a more
abstract framework. A full development and account of the related emerging pricing theory
is given in the book Brigo et al. [2013].
Starting from such results Pallavicini and Brigo [2013] discuss the consequences for pricing
models. In particular, the authors focus on interest-rate models and on the pricing of interest-
rate swaps. Under suitable assumptions they approximate the impact of hedging, funding and
margining fees in pricing equations as a modification of discount factors and of forward rates.
Furthermore, they stress the importance of including these corrections also in calibration or
bootstrapping algorithms which are used to calculate the parameters of pricing models. As
an example they re-formulate the multiple-curve HJM model of Moreni and Pallavicini [2010,
2013] to be able to seize the impact in price of changing the collateralization procedure of a
given interest-rate derivative. In particular, they discuss the case of interest-rate derivatives
traded with a CCP extending the results of Cont et al. [2011].
In this paper we try to distill the above contributions to highlight the common ingredients
that a new pricing framework should include to be effective in a world where credit and
liquidity issues cannot be disregarded. Furthermore, a key component of any quantitative
analysis of trades is the margining procedure and the impact of initial and variation margins on
the deal profitability. We briefly summarize our earlier results in Pallavicini and Brigo [2013]
in order to be able to focus on concrete pricing cases such as partially collateralized deals,
bilateral CSA deals, and contracts cleared through CCPs, the latter being quite sensitive
following pressure from Dodd Frank and EMIR/CRD4 to move deals to CCPs. See for
instance Arnsdorf [2011], Pirrong [2011], Cont et al. [2011], and Heller and Vause [2012].
We present both theoretical results and the discussion of numerical cases for the interest
rate market. In particular, we describe how to price interest-rate swaps (IRS) cleared by
a CCP or traded under a standard bilateral CSA with a particular attention to wrong-way
risk and initial margins. We analyze the relative size of the different contributions due to
credit and funding, wrong way risk, and draw conclusion on the overall patterns. A specific
point that is made in this paper is that approaching an additive decomposition of funding,
margining and credit costs is, in simplified contexts, possible. The fundamental nonlinearity
of the valuation procedures in presence of funding costs has been pointed out earlier by us,
among others, in Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012]. The funding rates that the treasury will
apply depend on the future value of the same product we are pricing, and such value in turn
depends on the future value of the funding rates. This leads to nonlinear and aggregation-
dependent valuation that manifests itself in the nonlinearity of the pricing operator. While
credit risk and CVA make the payoff nolinear, starting from a possibly linear one, funding
costs have a more dramatic impact in that they make the pricing operator (or the related
expectation) nonlinear. A consequence of this is that the partition of valuation adjustments
in purely credit and funding ones is not possible in general. However, in this paper, through a
number of specific simplifying choices with precise financial interpretation, we achieve a quasi
separable decomposition of the total valuation adjustment into funding, credit and margining
costs and illustrate it into the above mentioned numerical examples.
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The paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2 we introduce CCPs and CSA trades in detail, looking both at the sys-
temic/macro implications and at the micro/single player view. Variation and initial margins,
in particular, are introduced and discussed.
In Section 3 we summarize the valuation theory developed previously in Pallavicini et al.
[2011, 2012], Pallavicini and Brigo [2013], see also the non-technical survey paper Brigo and
Pallavicini [2013]. We also update the previous theory to include Initial Margins specifically
and CCP mechanics, and possibly delays in the closeout procedure. This is an important
feature that was missing in our previous works, so that this paper presents some novelty also
in the general methodology.
In Section 4 we apply the general valuation apparatus to interest rate modeling. By
specific assumptions on the exposure, on the information (filtrations), on contagion and on
margining we achieve a way to contain nonlinearities in the pricing operator and to obtain
a decomposition into Credit, Debit, Funding and Margining Valuation Adjustments (CVA,
DVA, FVA, MVA) over a basic mark to market.
In Section 5 we apply the methodology to a numerical case study and illustrate the relative
size of the different adjustments and the wrong way risk patterns through the study of an
interest rate swap portfolio.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Valuation under Credit, Collateral and Funding: CCPs and
CSAs
After the onset of the crisis in 2007, under the pressure of the liquidity crisis reducing the
credit lines along with the fear of an imminent systemic break-down, all market instruments
began to be quoted by taking into account, more or less implicitly, credit and funding liq-
uidity adjustments. As a consequence classical pricing models, which often ignore credit and
liquidity issues, require a careful check of standard theoretical assumptions. Assumptions
and approximations stemming from abstract pricing theory should be replaced by strategies
implemented with market instruments. We need to go back to market observables by limit-
ing ourselves to price only derivative contracts we are able to replicate by means of market
instruments. The comparison to market data and processes is the only means we have to
validate our theoretical assumptions, so as to drop them if in contrast with observations.
A paradigmatic example is the inclusion of credit valuation adjustments (CVA) for interest-
rate instruments, such as those analyzed in Brigo and Pallavicini [2007], that breaks the re-
lationship between risk-free zero coupon bonds and LIBOR forward rates. Also, funding in
domestic currency on different time horizons must include counterparty risk adjustments and
liquidity issues, see Filipovic and Trolle [2012], breaking again this relationship. A direct
consequence is the impossibility to describe all LIBOR rates in terms of a unique zero-coupon
yield curve. Indeed, since 2009 and even earlier, we had evidence that the money market for
the Euro area was moving to a multi-curve setting. Many papers were devoted to the topics,
by starting from the first papers by Henrard [2007, 2009], Kijima et al. [2009], Mercurio [2009,
2010], and Pallavicini and Tarenghi [2010].
Moreover, the growing attention on counterparty credit risk is transforming OTC deriva-
tives money markets. An increasing number of derivative contracts is cleared by CCPs, while
most of the remaining contracts are traded under collateralization, regulated by a Credit
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Client Client
IM
VM
Figure 1: Flows of initial and variation margin within counterparties acting in a bilateral
contract. IM stands for initial margin, while VM for variation margin. The two margins flow
in both directions.
Support Annex (CSA). Both cleared and CSA deals require collateral posting, as default
insurance, along with its remuneration. We cannot neglect such effects on valuation.
A general point on our terminology is that whenever we use the term ”bilateral trade” in
a context with collateral, we are referring to a deal covered by a bilateral CSA and not to a
deal going through a CCP. The short sentence ”cleared trade” refers instead to a deal going
through a CCP. Part of our analysis applies also to bilateral trades without collateral at all,
although our main interest in the present paper is the margining process.
In the following sections we look in detail to derivative contracts to list all the cash flows
and fees needed to effectively close a position. Even if different asset classes have derivatives
markets that may operate differently, the general principles of our approach are not linked to
a particular asset class. Nonetheless, in this paper we focus, as a main example, on interest-
rate derivatives, which are a representative case given interest rate swaps prevalence in cleared
contracts. In particular, we analyze the collateral procedure and the hedging strategy to detect
the presence of possible funding costs. Before looking at this in detail, we introduce CCPs
and margining more in detail.
2.1 Valuation in presence of CCPs: a few basic questions
A possible attitude to the onset of collateralization, either through CCPs or through bilateral
collateralized trades (under CSA), is that this will make all calculations of counterparty risk
pricing and/or funding costs either trivial or irrelevant. For example, CVA could disappear,
while Funding Valuation Adjustments would be trivially covered by margining costs. The
methodological complexity highlighted in earlier works such as for example Pallavicini et al.
[2012], Brigo et al. [2013], and Pallavicini and Brigo [2013] would become irrelevant. We
believe this is a naive stance and devote now a short section to criticize this conception of
valuation, hedging, credit and liquidity risk and collateral modeling.
Let us start with an obvious question: what are CCPs and what is their role? CCPs are
commercial entities that, ideally, would interpose themselves between the two parties in a
trade.
More specifically, a CCP acts as a market participant who is taking the risk of the coun-
terparty default and ensures that the payments are performed even in case of default. To
achieve this an initial bilateral trade, shown in figure 1, is split into two trades, with the CCP
standing in between the parties (clients). In practice, the counterparties operate with the
CCP by means of intermediate clearing members as in the scheme listed in figure 2.
• Each client enters into a deal with his clearing member which offsets the position with
the CCP. There are no more direct obligations between the two clients.
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CCP
Client
Clearing
Member Clearing
House
Clearing
Member
Client
IM
VM
IM
VM
IM
VM
IM
VM
Figure 2: Flows of initial and variation margin within counterparties acting in a centrally
cleared contract. IM stands for initial margin, and it flows only towards the CCP. VM stands
for variation margin, and it flows in both directions.
• Each party will post collateral margins say daily, every time the mark-to-market goes
against that party. This is called Variation Margin (VM).
• Moreover, there is also an initial margin (IM) that is supposed to cover for additional
risks like deteriorating quality of collateral, gap risk, wrong way risk, and so on. This
may be posted at need.
• VM posted by one party is passed by the CCP to the other party in the trade, whereas
IM will be held by the CCP and will not be passed to the other party.
• If a party in the deal defaults and the mark-to-market is in favour of the other party,
then the surviving party will keep the VM and also possibly obtain the IM from the
CCP and will not be affected, in principle, by counterparty risk.
CCPs will reduce risk in many cases but are not a panacea. They require daily margining,
and one may question: (i) the pricing of the fees they apply, (ii) the appropriateness of the
initial margins and of over-collateralization buffers that are supposed to account for wrong-
way risk and collateral gap-risk, among other features, and (iii) the default risk of Clearing
Members and, even, of CCPs themselves.
An important issue for clients is that the CCP does not post part of the collateral (initial
margins) directly to the entities trading with it, as the collateral agreement is not symmetric.
In a scenario of a CCP default one has the over-collateralization cost to lose in a uncollater-
alized type CVA situation. Hopefully, the default probability is low, making CVA small, bar
strong contagion, gap risk and wrong-way risk, that may or may not be adequately covered
by initial margins. However unlikely, however, CCPs defaults have not been uncommon in
the past. Defaulted CCPs include the following. 1974: Caisse de Liquidation des Affaires en
Marchandises; 1983: Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House; 1987: Hong Kong Futures
Exchange. The ones that were close to default are 1987: CME and OCC, USA; 1999: BM&F,
Brazil.
Valuation of the above risks requires CVA and funding costs type analytics, inclusive
of collateral gap-risk and wrong-way risk, similar to those discussed in earlier papers and
books, see for example Pallavicini et al. [2012], Brigo et al. [2013] and Pallavicini and Brigo
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Figure 3: Bilateral trades and exposures without CCPs (on the left) and with CPPs (on the
right). Each node lists the sum of positive exposures, each arrow the due cash flows. The
diagram refers to the discussion in Kiff [2009].
[2013]. Indeed, unless one trusts blindly a specific clearing house, it will be still necessary
to access residual CVA and funding analytics and risk measures. There are also important
considerations on the macroeconomic and systemic effects of CCPs, and while we do not
discuss such aspects in details here, to those we turn now briefly. As discussed in Piron
[2012], the above CCPs default are to be kept in mind, and further one needs to note that
CCPs are usually highly capitalized. All clearing members post collateral in an asymmetric
way. Initial margin means clearing members are over-collateralized all the time. The TABB
Group says extra collateral could be about 2 $ Trillion Rhode [2011].
On the positive side, there is undoubtedly an important netting benefit with CCPs, and
this is illustrated with a toy example in Figure 3.
However, in reality this is not so clear. A typical bank may have a quite large number of
outstanding trades, making the netting clause quite material. With just one CCP for all asset
classes across countries and continents, netting efficiency would certainly improve. However,
in real life CCPs deal with specific asset classes or geographical areas, and this may even
reduce netting efficiency compared to now, as discussed in Cont and Kokholm [2013], that
refines the earlier analysis in Duffie and Zhu [2011].
CCPs compete with each other and one can be competitive in specific areas but hardly in
all of them. Some CCPs will be profitable in specific asset classes and countries. They will
deal mostly with standardized transactions. Even if CCPs could function across countries,
bankruptcy laws can make collateral held in one place unusable to cover losses in other places,
as pointed out in Singh [2011].
The geographical angle seems to be an issue, with no international law addressing how
CCPs would connect through EMIR/CDR 4/Basel III and DFA. For example, as of 2012
there is “No legal construct to satisfy both Dodd Frank Act and EMIR and allow EU clients
to access non-EU CCPs’ Wayne [2012]. There are also other conflicts in this respect. Where
will CCPs be located and which countries will they serve? For example, the European Central
Bank is adopting a rule that limits operations of UK based CCPs such as LCH–Clearnet for
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Euro denominated deals. This lead to a legal battle with the UK government invoking the
European Court of Justice.
To compete CCPs may lower margin requirements, which would make them riskier, re-
membering also the above CCPs defaults. In the US, where the OTC derivatives market
is going through slightly more than 10 large dealers and is largely concentrated among 5,
we could have a conflict of interest. If CCPs end up incorporating most trades currently
occurring OTC bilaterally, then CCPs could become “too big to fail”, Miller [2011].
We may conclude this introduction by saying that even with CCPs in place, one needs a
strong analytical and numerical apparatus for pricing/hedging and risk. For all the reasons
we illustrated, CCPs are not the end of CVA and its funding costs extensions, and this paper
is devoted precisely at trades valuation in presence of CCPs or CSAs, or simply of bilateral
trades under credit and funding costs. Our general framework takes into account residual
credit risk and gap risk, initial and variation margins, collateral, close-out netting rules, and
wrong-way risk. Our approach is fully arbitrage free but based only on market observables.
We will develop this theory and its applications formally in Section 3, seeing that basic
financial facts lead to complex mathematical tools such as BSDEs. However, before looking
at that, we introduce a more detailed analysis of CCPs and CSAs, and further we introduce
basic formulas for including initial and variation margins into valuation.
2.2 Trading via CSA or CCP: Analogies and Differences
Since many years clearing houses (CCP) started to clear interest-rate swaps. For instance,
LCH after a few years of studies introduced in 1999 clearing services for plain-vanilla interest-
rate swaps in four major currencies. After the crisis of 2007 an increasing number of operations
moved from a bilateral OTC agreement under CSA to a cleared trade. As we have seen
above, a CCP interposes itself between the buyer and the seller of trades, becoming their
new counterparty. In order to protect itself from market and credit risks, the Clearing House
calculates exposures and calls margin daily. If one decides not to trade through a CCP, one
may still decide to exchange collateral margins daily with the counterparty in a more private
setting. With an eye to this situation, in 2011 ISDA developed a proposal for CSA agreements
which is in accordance with the collateralization practices adopted by clearing houses, and
then issued in 2013 as standard CSA (SCSA), see ISDA [2013]. The SCSA aims at a similar
treatment of collateralization for bilateral and cleared trades: it restricts eligible collateral
for variation margins to cash, promotes the adoption of overnight rate as collateral rate, and
factors in currency risks for the collateral calculation.
In a cleared trade the counterparty of a CCP has to insure the clearing house against
any credit or market risk by posting collateral, known as variation margin, to match the
mark-to-market variation of the deal. It is market practice to pay interest on cash collateral.
CCPs usually compensate variation margin with overnight interest rates, as done in identical
uncleared bilateral trades under CSA. The analysis of the impact of variation margin proce-
dures can be found in Cont et al. [2011], where convexity adjustments and NPV effects are
discussed for different clearing houses. These two effects are also discussed in Pallavicini and
Brigo [2013].
Moreover, the counterparty has to cover any potential future exposures resulting in re-
placement costs, as discussed in Heller and Vause [2012]. In particular, a CCP is vulnerable
to losses on defaulting counterparty exposures between the time of the last variation margin
payment of the defaulting counterparty and close-out valuation. This is known as margin
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period of risk. Furthermore, initial margin may cover gap risks, namely adverse variations in
mark to market since the last collateral posting. Initial margins are a source of funding costs
for the counterparty, which is forced to post additional collateral assets to protect the CCP.
On the other hand, initial margins are not posted by the CCP to the counterparty, so that
they do not result in a funding benefit.
In the case of a CSA, independent amounts are posted at the beginning of the trade,
to cover for additional risks that are not met by variation margins, for example gap risk.
However, with the standard CSA we are moving towards an Initial Margins approach similar
to the approach of CCPs, where the initial margin may be paid several times during the life
of the deal in case there is a perceived deterioration of gap risk and related issues.
2.3 CCP: Clearing Members and Recoveries
We look now at the trade in place between one client and his clearing member, and, in
particular, at the collateral procedure. We identify the client with the letter “C” used to
name the counterparty of the deal in section 3 below, and the clearing member with the letter
“I” used to name the investment bank below.
The two parties post and receive the variation margin, while only the client posts the
initial margin. The variation margin can be re-hypothecated, while the initial margin is
segregated in a different account. In case of re-hypothecation, the collateral provider must
therefore consider the possibility to recover only a fraction of his collateral. If the clearing
member is the collateral taker, we denote the recovery fraction on re-hypothecated collateral
by R′I , while if the client is the collateral taker, then we denote the recovery fraction on
re-hypothecated collateral by R′C . Accordingly, we define the collateral loss incurred by the
client upon clearing member default by LGD′I = 1−R′I and the collateral loss incurred by the
clearing member upon client default by LGD′C = 1−R′C .
In a CSA bilateral deal, typically, the surviving party has precedence on other creditors
to get back his collateral, thus RI ≤ R′I ≤ 1, and RC ≤ R′C ≤ 1. Here, RI (RC) denote the
recovery fraction of the market value of the transaction that the client (clearing member) gets
when the clearing member (client) defaults.
On the other hand, in the specific case of a deal cleared via a CCP, we have that, in case
of default of the clearing member, the deal is transferred to backup clearing members (if any),
so that recovery rates should be equal to one. Yet, the transfer procedure is implemented in
terms of a competitive auction, where the backup clearing members are not forced to accept
the client position, which, if rejected by them, is liquidated on the market. As a result losses
may occur from this procedure, leading to recovery fractions possibly less than one.
In the following sections we describe the mechanics of centrally cleared contracts from the
point of view of the client of a clearing broker, since we aim at evaluating its replication price
for a cleared contract. Furthermore, we will discuss also the case of a bilateral contract when
the initial margin is posted.
2.4 Funding Netting Sets, Margins and Re-hypothecation
The different prescriptions on variation and initial margins re-hypothecation must be con-
sidered when evaluating the cash needed to implement the hedging strategy, which, in turn,
affects evaluation of funding costs (we will give a precise expression for these costs in equa-
tions (5) and (6) below). Here, we generalize the discussion of Pallavicini et al. [2011] to a
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collateralization strategy based on variation and initial margins.
In February 2013 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) issued a second consultative docu-
ment on margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives BCBS/IOSCO [2013]. The
aim is to introduce minimum standards for initial margin posting for non-centrally cleared
derivatives. The document discusses the methodologies for calculating initial and variation
margins in OTC derivatives traded between financial firms and systemically-important non-
financial entities. The principles guiding the proposal promote a margining practice similar
to the one adopted for centrally cleared products. This is a very important point in that CSA
bilateral deals will resemble more and more CCP cleared trades, with Initial and Variation
Margins features. In particularly, the newly proposed Initial Margin goes beyond the previous
notion of Independent Amounts.
According to the document we should introduce two initial margin accounts, one for
each party of the deal, so that we define three adapted processes Mt, N
C
t and N
I
t to model
respectively the variation margin, the initial margin posted by the counterparty, and the
initial margin posted by the investor, which represent the collateral assets exchanged by the
margining procedures, so that the total amount Ct of collateral assets, from the point of view
of “I”, is given by
Ct := Mt +N
C
t +N
I
t , N
C
t ≥ 0 , N It ≤ 0 . (1)
Each party is posting the initial margin without netting between the two accounts to protect
the other party from gap risk.
The case of a contract cleared by a CCP can be simply obtained by setting N It = 0, since
in this case the client ”C” is posting the initial margin, whereas the clearing member ”I” is
not. We now turn to re-hypothecation.
Different re-hypothecation clauses can hold on the variation and the initial margin ac-
counts. As a first possibility we assume that the variation margin can be re-hypothecated, so
that we can use it to reduce the cash needed by the hedging strategy, namely we can consider
the derivative and the variation margin as part of the same funding netting set. Thus, we
can replicate the derivative price by means of the following hedge
Vt = Ft +Mt +Ht . (2)
Here the value Vt of the claim is composed by the cash part Ft of the hedge portfolio, by the
collateral part given by the variation margin Mt, and by the risky component of the hedge
portfolio, namely Ht.
To fix ideas, let us think of an equity call option contract in the standard Black and
Scholes setting. Let St denote the price process of the underlying risky equity asset, and
assume constant and deterministic interest rates r. The risky hedge portfolio is the delta
position in the equity, Ht = Φ(d1(t, St))St, whereas the cash part of the hedge is the bank
account position needed to complete the hedge, namely Ft = −Ke−r(T−t)Φ(d2(t, St)), and
finally there is no margin, M = 0. Here Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal distribution and the d1 and d2 terms are the familiar Black-Scholes formula
terms that may be found in any option pricing textbook.
Going back to the general theory, we can extend our argument at portfolio level by adding
up all variation margins (when re-hypothecation is allowed) coming from derivatives belonging
to the same funding netting set. On the other hand, if the variation margin cannot be re-
hypothecated we have
Vt = Ft +Ht .
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In the following we assume that the variation margin can always be re-hypothecated. Formulas
for the opposite case follow in a straightforward manner.
It is now time to finally introduce the technicalities needed to face pricing in presence of
CCPs or CSAs. As mentioned earlier, this entails modeling credit risk and funding cost, the
margining process and the close-out netting rules, all in terms of precise cash flows and in
line with arbitrage-free derivatives valuation. This is where the technical part of the paper
begins.
3 A New Pricing Framework
In order to price a financial product (for example a derivative contract), we have to consider
all the cash flows occurring after the trading position is entered. We can group them as
follows:
1. product cash flows (e.g. coupons, dividends, premiums, final payout, etc.) inclusive of
hedging instruments cash flows;
2. cash flows required by the collateral margining procedure;
3. cash flows required by the funding and investing (borrowing and lending) procedures;
4. cash flows occurring upon default (close-out procedure).
We refer to the two names involved in the financial transaction and subject to default
risk as investor (also called name “I”, usually the bank, or the clearing member of CCP) and
counterparty (also called name “C”, for example a corporate client, but also another bank,
see again Figures 1 and 2).
We denote by τI and τC respectively the default times of the investor and counterparty.
We fix the portfolio time horizon T > 0, and fix the risk-neutral pricing model (Ω,G,Q), with
a filtration (Gt)t∈[0,T ] such that τC , τI are (Gt)t∈[0,T ]-stopping times. We denote by E[ · |Gt ]
the conditional expectation under Q given Gt, and by E[ · |Gτi ] the conditional expectation
under Q given the stopped filtration Gτi . We exclude the possibility of simultaneous defaults,
and define the first default event between the two parties as the stopping time
τ := τC ∧ τI .
We will also consider the default-free market sub-filtration (Ft)t≥0 that one obtains implicitly
by assuming a separable structure for the complete market filtration (Gt)t≥0. Gt is then
generated by the pure default-free market filtration Ft and by the filtration generated by all
the relevant default times monitored up to t (see for example Bielecki and Rutkowski [2002]).
3.1 The Master Pricing Equation in Presence of Credit, Collateral and
Funding
The price of a derivative, inclusive of collateralized credit and debit risk (CVA and DVA),
margining costs, and funding and investing costs can be derived by following Pallavicini et al.
[2011, 2012], and is given by the following master equation:
Vt = E
[
Π(t, T ∧ τ) + γ(t, T ∧ τ) + ϕ(t, T ∧ τ) + 1{t<τ<T}D(t, τ)θτ |Gt
]
, (3)
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where the terms are defined below1.
• Notation D(t, u) in general will denote the risk-neutral default-free and funding-free
discount factor, given by the ratio
D(t, u) = Bt/Bu , dBt = rtBtdt ,
where B is the bank account numeraire, driven by the risk free instantaneous interest
rate r and associated to the risk-neutral measure Q.
• Π(t, T ) is the sum of all discounted payoff terms in the interval (t, T ], without credit
or debit risk, without funding costs and without collateral cash flows. In other terms,
these are the financial instrument discounted cash flows without additional risks.
• γ(t, T ) represents the collateral margining costs within the interval (t, T ], and they are
equal to the cost-of-carry of the collateral account Ct, namely to
γ(t, u) :=
∫ u
t
dv (rv − cv)CvD(t, v) , (4)
where the collateral rate ct is defined by the CSA holding between the two counterpar-
ties, or by the CCP contractual rules.
• ϕ(t, T ) represents the funding and investing costs within the interval (t, T ], which con-
sists in the fees payed to the Treasury department to obtain the cash (or the benefits
received when the cash is to be invested), plus the spread over Treasury rates to be
payed (or received) to access the market of risky assets. We will explicitly define such
costs for bilateral and CCP-cleared trades in the following section where we extend the
analysis of Pallavicini et al. [2012].
• θτ is the price at τ of the cash flow payed or received at the end of the default procedure.
The cash flow depends on the value of the collateral account and on the residual value of
the claim being traded at default, also interpreted as the replacement cost for the deal at
default (close-out amount). It is primarily this term that originates the familiar Credit
and Debit Valuation Adjustments (CVA/DVA) terms. In the following we generalize
the analysis of Brigo et al. [2011c] to apply it both in presence of an explicit margin
period of risk and when many margin accounts are present.
The above definitions link the master pricing equation (3) to the collateralization proce-
dure holding between the two counterparties, and to the funding policies adopted by them.
As a direct consequence the replication price of contract, holding between two counterparties
under a bilateral CSA, is different from the price of the same contact when cleared with a
CCP. The same happens if the Treasury adopts different funding policies or the collateral
accounts have to be segregated not contributing to the funding netting set of the derivative.
In this paper we try to describe such different scenarios by illustrating the main ingredients
we have to take into account when pricing bilateral or centrally cleared contracts to gauge the
impact of credit risk and funding costs. We will make reasonable assumptions on contractual
1In Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012] the derivative price inclusive of credit an funding effects is denoted V¯t
and the market rates are marked with a tilde. This is done to distinguish them from funding costs-free prices.
Here, we use Vt for the full price and we drop the tilde for notation convenience.
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issues when the pricing framework does not force us to a particular a choice with the aim to
present numerical results.
Now that we have introduced the pricing framework in presence of credit, collateral,
margining and funding, including close-out netting rules and CVA type adjustments, we may
turn to applying this framework to pricing deals when a CCP is interposed or when a bilateral
CSA is present between two trading entities (e.g. the recent SCSA).
3.2 Funding Costs under Bilateral CSA or CCP Clearing
We recall that we value the contract from the point of view of the investor “I”.
First, we start by presenting the definition of funding costs given by Pallavicini et al.
[2012], which applies to the case of a bilateral contract with collateral re-hypothecation,
namely to the case Nt = 0. We have
ϕ(t, u) :=
∫ u
t
dv (rv − fv)FvD(t, v)−
∫ u
t
dv (fv − hv)HvD(t, v) , Nt .= 0 (5)
where ft is the Treasury rate that is established according to the funding policy, while ht is
the rate charged by the market to trade the hedging instruments contained in the account Ht.
The accounts Ft and Ht contain respectively the cash and the risky assets positions needed in
the hedging strategy, see our earlier example in the Black and Scholes setting. We will define
these rates ft and ht in the following, according to the specific pricing problem.
It is worth clarifying in detail where the different terms in the equation for ϕ come from.
The amount −(f − r)F is interpreted as the cost of funding for the cash part of the hedge.
Indeed, if we are for example in a position where F > 0 (and, typically, assume f > r) we are
borrowing cash from our treasury to keep the hedge F going. This cash is lent to our trading
desk and we have to pay (hence the minus sign) the treasury an amount of interest given by
the spread of the funding rate f over the risk free rate r. In the other case, if F is negative,
we have a positive amount (f − r)(−F ). Indeed, in this case the treasury will pay us interest
for the cash we are shorting, and this interest will be the treasury rate minus the risk free
rate, which is for us a positive funding benefit rather than a cost.
As for the second term, −(f −h)H, it is best to think this term as −(f − r)H + (h− r)H.
Assuming the hedge H to be positive, we need to borrow risky asset to maintain it. To get
this risky asset we need an amount of cash H equal to the asset price, and on this cash, which
we borrow from the treasury, we pay (hence the minus sign) the usual interest f − r. On the
other hand, as soon as we have the risky asset, we can repo-lend it at a rate h, gaining (hence
the plus sign) a spread h− r.
The above definition is valid if all the accounts which need funding are included within the
funding netting set defining the account Ft. If additional accounts are needed to implement
the collateralization procedure, for example segregated initial margins, as with CCP cleared
contracts and bilateral contracts under CSA with the forthcoming rules, then their funding
costs must be added to equation (5). If we consider additional initial margins, which are kept
into a segregated account, one posted by the investor (N It ≤ 0) and one by the counterparty
(NCt ≥ 0), we obtain
ϕ(t, u) :=
∫ u
t
dv (rv − fv)FvD(t, v)−
∫ u
t
dv (fv − hv)HvD(t, v) (6)
+
∫ u
t
dv(fN
C
v − rv)NCv +
∫ u
t
dv(fN
I
v − rv)N Iv ,
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where fN
C
t and f
NI
t are the funding rate assigned by the Treasury department to the initial
margin account, which, in line of principle, could be different from ft since the initial margins
are not in the funding netting set of the derivative.
The last two terms can be understood as follows. Consider, for instance, that the funding
rate is greater than the risk-free rate. The party which is posting the initial margin has a
penalty given by the cost of funding this extra collateral, while the party which is receiving it
reports a funding benefit, but only if the contractual rules allow him to invest the collateral in
some low-risk activity, otherwise the funding rate for the initial margin will be simply equal
to the risk free rate, and there are no price adjustments.
If we put this result back into the pricing equation (3), we get
Vt =
∫ T
t
E
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u)(Π(u, u+ du) + 1{τ∈du}θu) |Gt
]
(7)
+
∫ T
t
duE
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u)((fu − cu)Mu + (ru − fu)Vu − (ru − hu)Hu) |Gt
]
+
∫ T
t
duE
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u)((fN
C
u − cu)NCu + (fN
I
u − cu)N Iu) |Gt
]
where we have expressed as an integral also the first two terms. The above formula is not a
closed form formula, but an equation. This is because Vt appears also on the right hand side
and, furthermore, the rates on the right hand side might depend on Vt itself, as we will see
explicitly in Section 4.2 below. A formal application of the Feynman-Kac formula allows one
to obtain a nonlinear PDE formulation for this pricing problem, see for example Pallavicini
et al. [2011, 2012]. We now rewrite the above equation as a backward stochastic differential
equation (BSDE).
3.3 BSDE Formulation
The pricing equation can be reformulated as a backward stochastic differential equation
(BSDE) with terminal condition at the minimum time between default time and maturity. A
similar formulation in the case of bilateral trades can be found in Cre´pey [2011]. We multiply
both sides of (7) by D(0, t) and then we add
Xt :=
∫ t
0
du 1{u<τ}D(0, u)
(
Π(u, u+ du) + 1{τ∈du}θu + (fu − cu)Mu
+(fN
C
u − cu)NCu + fN
I
u − cu)N Iu + (ru − fu)Vu − (ru − hu)Hu
)
on both sides. We obtain
D(0, t)Vt +Xt = E[XT |Gt ] .
The right hand side is clearly a Gt martingale under the risk neutral measure, call it Mt.
Now differentiate with respect to time t both sides to obtain
−rtD(0, t)Vtdt+D(0, t)dVt + dXt = dMt .
Substituting for dXt leads to the BSDE formulation for t ∈ [0, τ ∧ T ]:
dVt−ftVt dt+Π(t, t+dt)+(ft−ct)Mt dt+(fNCt −ct)NCt dt+(fN
I
t −ct)N It dt−(rt−ht)Ht dt = dMt
(8)
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where the terminal condition is set at τ ∧ T as
Vτ∧T = 1{τ<T}θτ . (9)
If we assume that the underlying risk factors are described by a Markov diffusion, we can
apply the Itoˆ formula to obtain the following BSDE formulation which does not depend any
longer on the risk-free rate
dVt− ftVt dt+ Π(t, t+ dt) + (ft− ct)Mt dt+ (fNCt − ct)NCt dt+ (fN
I
t − ct)N It dt = dMht (10)
where Mht is a G-martingale under a measure Qh where the growth rate of the underlying
risky assets is given by the market rate ht. We can obtain this result also by formally applying
the Feynman-Kac theorem on equation (7) as in Pallavicini et al. [2012], and then deriving
the BSDE formulation as above.
Equation (10) is highly non-linear since the variation and initial margins and the rates ct,
ft, f
NC
t , f
NI
t and ht may depend on the derivative price V itself and on its partial derivatives
w.r.t. the underlying risky assets. Consider for instance the possibility of asymmetric funding
rates (borrowing vs lending) according to the sign of the cash needed to implement the hedging
strategy, or a variation margin equal to a fraction of the derivative price. Some explicit
examples can be found in Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012] and Pallavicini and Brigo [2013].
Furthermore, a possible dependency of ht on the derivative price leads to a forward-backward
system of stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) as discussed for instance in Pardoux and
Tang [1999]. A complete study of the above equation is beside the scope of the present paper,
but we can refer the reader to El Karoui et al. [1997] for a review on the BSDE formulation
of pricing equations.
In the following sections we numerically solve equation (10) in a simpler setting when
dealing with interest-rate derivatives cleared by CCPs.
It is useful for the discussion in the next sections to write equation (10) again in terms
of an expectation, now under the Qh measure. We obtain by formally integrating the BSDE
formulation
Vt =
∫ T
t
Eh
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u; f)(Π(u, u+ du) + 1{τ∈du}θu) | Gt
]
(11)
+
∫ T
t
duEh
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u; f)((fu − cu)Mu + (fN
C
u − cu)NCu + (fN
I
u − cu)N Iu) | Gt
]
where we define the expression
D(t, T ;x) := exp
{
−
∫ T
t
duxu
}
.
In the next section we continue the discussion by inspecting the closeout cash flow θτ
occurring in the terminal condition in case of early default.
3.4 Close-Out Netting Rules and Gap Risk
In case of early default of the client “C”, the clearing member “I” takes responsibility for
the position as in a bilateral trade. The default procedures may take δ days to be completed
(margin period of risk), and in such time-frame the mark-to-market value of the derivative
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may change considerably, leading to an exposure showing a large mismatch with the value of
collateral assets.
Since we have a delay between the first default time τ and the end of the default procedure
at τ + δ, we should consider the possibility that also the surviving party may default in this
lapse of time. In such case we assume that the first default procedure stays in place with the
surviving party substituted by his bankruptcy trustee, so that the cash flows originating from
such party may be reduced by a recovery rate.
The cash flows occurring in the bilateral case are described in Brigo et al. [2011b]. Here,
we extend that analysis by considering both initial and variation margins, and by introducing
explicitly the margin period of risk.
3.5 Margin Period of Risk
When the counterparty (or the client in the CCP case) ”C” is the first name to default,
say at time τ , the investor (the clearing member) ”I” evaluates the exposure ε, also known
as close-out amount. This valuation is defined by searching for a replacement deal on the
market, as described by the relevant ISDA documentation ISDA [2010]. This documentation
specifies that the surviving party may take into account the costs of terminating, liquidating
or re-establishing any hedge or related trading position and, furthermore, can consider the
cost of funding. A more detailed discussion can be found in Brigo et al. [2011b].
In particular, we can describe the default procedure by assuming that at default time τ
the surviving party enters a deal with a cash flow ϑ, at maturity time τ + δ, depending on
the close-out netting rules. These rules will depend also on the close-out amount ετ+δ and on
the value of the variation and initial margin accounts just before the default event, namely
on Mτ− , N
C
τ− , and N
I
τ− . The deal is funded by the surviving party, so that we can use (11)
to calculate the price θτ and we get
θτ := Eh
[
D(τ, τ + δ; fS)ϑτ+δ
(
ετ+δ,Mτ− , N
C
τ− , N
I
τ−
) | Gτ ]
where fSt is the funding rate of the surviving party, and we have dropped the default time
indicators since we are assuming that, in case of further default of the surviving party, this
is substituted by his bankruptcy trustee in the default procedure. Notice that in the case
of a CCP cleared contract we have N Iτ− = 0, whatever the default time, since the clearing
member does not post the initial margin.
The above result relies on knowledge of fSt which, in turn, implies that the price depends
on the funding rates of both parties. Yet, the margin period of risk is a time interval of a
few days (five for a CCP, and ten for a CSA based bilateral contract), so that we can safely
approximate the discount factors by assuming that the payment happens at τ without mod-
elling the funding rates of both parties. Furthermore, we could compare this approximation
with the more relevant uncertainties associated with the recovery rates and the close-out val-
ues, concluding that the effects of this approximation are second order effects. Thus, in the
following we simply write
θτ := Eh
[
ϑτ+δ
(
ετ+δ,Mτ− , N
C
τ− , N
I
τ−
) | Gτ ] (12)
In the above equation we need to evaluate the margin accounts just before the default
time. Since the margining procedure is on a discrete time grid, we need to define the account
values between two margining dates. By following Pallavicini et al. [2011] we consider that
each account accrues continuously at collateral rate ct.
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3.6 The Default Procedure
We can now investigate the close-out netting rules to calculate ϑτ+δ in terms of the close-
out amount and collateralization accounts. We have different situations according to the
sign of the close-out amount and the collateral accounts2. We list them below in scenarios
where the counterparty “C” (the client in the CCP case) defaults first, i.e. when 1{τC<τI}
holds, the other cases being analogous. Hence, the four cases below represent all possible four
combinations of signs of exposure and variation margins when
τ = τC < τI , N
C
τ− ≥ 0, N Iτ− ≤ 0.
3.6.1 Positive Exposure and Positive Variation Margin
We consider a bilateral contract when the investor measures a positive close-out amount on
counterparty default, and some collateral posted as variation margin by the counterparty is
available, so that
ετ+δ ≥ 0, Mτ− ≥ 0.
In this case the investor’s exposure is reduced by netting with both the initial and the
variation margin, and the remaining collateral is returned to the counterparty. In detail, we
can differentiate three different situations:
1. The collateral is not enough to cover the exposure, so that the investor suffers a loss,
then he gets back his initial margin:
1{τC<τI}1{ετ+δ≥0}1{Mτ−≥0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−≥NCτ−}
(RC(ετ+δ −Mτ− −NCτ−)−N Iτ−) .
2. The collateral is enough to cover the exposure if both the variation margin and coun-
terparty’s initial margin are used, so that the investor does not suffer any loss, then he
gets back his initial margin:
1{τC<τI}1{ετ+δ≥0}1{Mτ−≥0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<NCτ−}
(ετ+δ −Mτ− −NCτ− −N Iτ−) .
3. The collateral is enough to cover the exposure by using only the variation margin, so that
the investor does not suffer any loss. The investor gets back his initial margin unless he
defaults before the end of the margin period of risk. In such case the investor’s initial
margin can be used to reduce losses. Thus, if the investor defaults after the margin
period of risk, we have
1{τC+δ<τI}1{ετ+δ≥0}1{Mτ−≥0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<0}(ετ+δ −Mτ− −N
C
τ− −N Iτ−) ,
while, if the investor defaults within the margin period of risk, we have
1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ≥0}1{Mτ−≥0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<0}(ετ+δ −Mτ− −N
I
τ−)
+
+ 1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ≥0}1{Mτ−≥0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<0}R
′
I(ετ+δ −Mτ− −N Iτ−)−
− 1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ≥0}1{Mτ−≥0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<0}N
C
τ− .
2We recall that we consider all the cash flows from the point of view of the investor “I” (or the clearing
member in the CCP case), and we define in our notation X+ := max(X, 0), X− := min(X, 0).
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3.6.2 Positive Exposure and Negative Variation Margin
We continue with a bilateral contract when the investor measures a positive close-out amount
on counterparty default, and some collateral posted as variation margin by the investor is
available, so that
ετ+δ > 0, Mτ− < 0.
In this case the investor’s exposure is reduced by netting with the initial margin, while the
variation margin is returned to the counterparty if it is not re-hypothecated, otherwise only
a recovery fraction of it is returned. In detail, we can distinguish two different situations:
1. The counterparty’s initial margin is not enough to cover the exposure, so that the
investor suffers a loss, then he gets back his initial margin:
1{τC<τI}1{ετ+δ≥0}1{Mτ−<0}1{ετ+δ≥NCτ−}
(RC(ετ+δ −NCτ−)−R′CMτ− −N Iτ−) .
2. The counterparty’s initial margin is enough to cover the exposure, so that the investor
does not suffer any loss, unless the variation margin is re-hypothecated, then he gets
back his initial margin:
1{τC<τI}1{ετ+δ≥0}1{Mτ−<0}1{ετ+δ<NCτ−}
((ετ+δ−Mτ−−NCτ−)−+R′C(ετ+δ−Mτ−−NCτ−)+−N Iτ−) .
Notice that in this case we have not to further differentiate according to the default of
the investor, since he holds only the counterparty’s initial margin, which is segregated,
and not the variation margin, so that there are not losses arising from the investor’s
default within the margin period of risk.
3.6.3 Negative Exposure and Positive Variation Margin
We consider a bilateral contract when the investor measures a negative close-out amount on
counterparty default, and some collateral posted as variation margin by the counterparty is
available, so that
ετ+δ < 0, Mτ− ≥ 0.
In this case the exposure is paid to the counterparty, and the counterparty gets back its
collateral in full, unless the investor defaults within the margin period of risk. Thus, if the
investor defaults after the margin period of risk, we have
1{τC+δ<τI}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−≥0}(ετ+δ −Mτ− −N
C
τ− −N Iτ−) ,
while, if the investor defaults within the margin period of risk, we have
1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−≥0}RI(ετ+δ −N
I
τ−)
−
+ 1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−≥0}R
′
I((ετ+δ −N Iτ−)+ −Mτ−)−
+ 1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−≥0}((ετ+δ −N
I
τ−)
+ −Mτ−)+
− 1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−≥0}N
C
τ− .
The above formula is simply the contributions occurring in the case discussed in the previous
case when the investor is the first defaulting name.
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3.6.4 Negative Exposure and Negative Variation Margin
We conclude by discussing a bilateral contract when the investor measures a negative close-
out amount on counterparty default, and some collateral posted as variation margin by the
investor is available, so that
ετ+δ < 0, Mτ− < 0.
In this case the initial margin is used to reduce the possible losses coming from a re-
hypothecated variation margin. In detail, by following the same scheme of the first case, we
can differentiate three different situations:
1. The counterparty’s initial margin is not enough to cover the losses due to the re-
hypothecation of the variation margin, so that the investor suffers a loss, then he gets
back his initial margin:
1{τC<τI}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−<0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−≥NCτ−}
(R′C(ετ+δ −Mτ− −NCτ−)−N Iτ−) .
2. The counterparty’s initial margin is enough to cover the losses due to the re-hypothecation
of the variation margin, so that the investor does not suffer any loss, then he gets back
his initial margin:
1{τC<τI}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−<0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<NCτ−}
(ετ+δ −Mτ− −NCτ− −N Iτ−) .
3. The variation margin is not returned to the investor since he has to pay a greater
exposure. The investor gets back his initial margin unless he defaults before the end
of the margin period of risk. In such case the investor’s initial margin can be used to
reduce losses. Thus, if the investor defaults after the margin period of risk, we have
1{τC+δ<τI}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−<0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<0}(ετ+δ −Mτ− −N
C
τ− −N Iτ−) ,
while, if the investor defaults within the margin period of risk, we have
1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−<0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<0}(ετ+δ −Mτ− −N
I
τ−)
+
+ 1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−<0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<0}RI(ετ+δ −Mτ− −N
I
τ−)
−
− 1{τC<τI<τC+δ}1{ετ+δ<0}1{Mτ−<0}1{ετ+δ−Mτ−<0}N
C
τ− .
3.7 Cash Flows on Default Event
We have now to sum the above cash flows based on the counterparty defaulting first (the
client in the CCP case) with the similar cash flows occurring when the investor (the clearing
member) is the first name to default, each cash flow embedding the relevant default indicators.
The latter case originates in the bilateral CSA case the same default procedure seen from the
opposite side, so that the cash flows can be deduced by symmetry arguments as in Brigo et al.
[2011b], while in the CCP case a different default procedure takes place and it is managed
by the clearing house. However, from the point of view of the cash flows we can do the
calculations as in the bilateral case by exchanging the clearing member and the client names
in the above equations while changing at the same time the sign of all cash flows.
Once the cash flows exchanged on τ + δ are known, we can evaluate ϑτ+δ, and in turn
θτ . If we sum all the cash flows along with the values of the variation and initial margin
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accounts just before the default event, and we add the sum of all margin accounts just before
the default event, we get
θbilateralτ = Eh[ ετ+δ | Gτ ] (13)
− Eh[ 1{τC<τI+δ}LGDC((ετ+δ −NCτ−)+ −M+τ−)+ | Gτ ]
− Eh[ 1{τC<τI+δ}LGD′C((ετ+δ −NCτ−)− −M−τ−)+ | Gτ ]
− Eh[ 1{τI<τC+δ}LGDI((ετ+δ −N Iτ−)− −M−τ−)− | Gτ ]
− Eh[ 1{τI<τC+δ}LGD′I((ετ+δ −N Iτ−)+ −M+τ−)− | Gτ ]
where the first term is the replacement price of the deal, as seen at default time, while
the second and third terms are the counterparty risk due to client default (also known as
counterparty valuation adjustment or CVA), and come with a negative sign (always from the
point of view of the clearing member). The fourth and fifth terms represent the counterparty
risk due to clearing member default (also known as debit valuation adjustment or DVA) and
come with a positive sign (again from the point of view of the clearing member).
We notice that the indicators appearing in equation (13) are not mutually exclusive, but
they can be all different from zero when the time interval between the two default times is
less than the margin period of risk. Indeed, the CVA terms contribute to the final cash flows
even if the first name that defaults is the clearing member, provided that the client defaults
before the end of the default procedure. A similar situation arises for the DVA terms too.
Then, if we assume that in case of re-hypothecation of the variation margin the recovery
rate for the collateral is the same used for the derivative, we can write
θrehypτ := Eh[ ετ+δ | Gτ ] (14)
− Eh[ 1{τC<τI+δ}LGDC(ετ+δ −NCτ− −Mτ−)+ | Gτ ]
− Eh[ 1{τI<τC+δ}LGDI(ετ+δ −N Iτ− −Mτ−)− | Gτ ] .
On the other hand, if re-hypothecation is forbidden, we can set the collateral recovery
rate to one, and we obtain
θno−rehypτ := Eh[ ετ+δ | Gτ ] (15)
− Eh[ 1{τC<τI+δ}LGDC((ετ+δ −NCτ−)+ −M+τ−)+ | Gτ ]
− Eh[ 1{τI<τC+δ}LGDI((ετ+δ −N Iτ−)− −M−τ−)− | Gτ ] .
In the case of a CCP cleared contract, we can set N I
.
= 0 into equation (13), since the
initial margin is posted only by the client. Furthermore, if we can assume with certainty that
upon clearing member default the position is transferred to a backup clearing member, so
that we set the recovery rate for the clearing member to one, then we can completely drop
the third term on the right-hand side of equations (14) and (15).
θCCPτ := Eh[ ετ+δ | Gτ ] (16)
− Eh[ 1{τC<τI+δ}LGDC(ετ+δ −NCτ− −Mτ−)+ | Gτ ]
− Eh[ 1{τI<τC+δ}LGDI(ετ+δ −Mτ−)− | Gτ ]
≈ Eh[ ετ+δ − 1{τC<τI+δ}LGDC(ετ+δ −NCτ− −Mτ−)+ | Gτ ] .
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In the following we assume that the variation margin can be re-hypothecated, so that we
can substitute the on-default cash flows given by equation (14) in the pricing equation (11)
to get
Vt =
∫ T
t
Eh
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u; f)Π(u, u+ du) | Gt
]
(17)
+
∫ T
t
duEh
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u; f)((fu − cu)Mu + (fN
C
u − cu)NCu ) + (fN
I
u − cu)N Iu) | Gt
]
+
∫ T
t
Eh
[
1{τ∈du}D(t, u; f)εu+δ | Gt
]
−
∫ T
t
Eh
[
1{τ∈du}1{τC<τI+δ}D(t, u; f)LGDC(εu+δ −NCu− −Mu−)+ | Gt
]
−
∫ T
t
Eh
[
1{τ∈du}1{τI<τC+δ}D(t, u; f)LGDI(εu+δ −N Iu− −Mu−)− | Gt
]
.
We obtain a pricing equation (17) which can be used both for bilateral and CCP cleared
trades. In the CCP case we assume N It = 0 and a loss given default for the investor close to
zero, as we show in the numerical section.
3.8 Close-Out Amount Evaluation
According to ISDA [2010], the surviving party searches for a replacement deal on the market
to evaluate the close-out amount, and he can include any costs of terminating, liquidating or
re-establishing any hedge or related trading position, along with the cost of funding. Such
definition is supported by ISDA documentation, but it is difficult to implement, since we do
not know the counterparty of the replacement deal, and, as a consequence, we cannot seize
his credit charge into the pricing equations in a precise way. In the literature many recipes are
adopted to circumvent this problem. We address the reader to Brigo et al. [2011b], Burgard
and Kjaer [2011b], or Durand and Rutkowski [2013] for technical discussions, and to Brigo
et al. [2013] for a review.
Here, we focus on a particular recipe: we assume that the close-out amount is equal to the
mark-to-market of the derivative contract considered between two default-free counterparties
in case of perfect collateralization. This solution can be considered as a generalization of the
risk-free close-out often used in the literature. However, different recipes may be adopted
within our framework.
Remark 3.1. (Close-Out Amount and Funding Costs). According to the ISDA [2010]
documentation the surviving party can include funding costs within the close-out amount eval-
uation. Thus, we could search for a close-out amount of the form
ετ (f
S) = 1{τ=τI<τC}ετI (f
I) + 1{τ=τC<τI}ετC (f
C)
where we have explicitly written the dependency on funding rates. Notice that the funding
rates of the surviving party are used in the estimation of the above amount. Such approach
has the drawback of including into the pricing equation the funding costs of both parties, so
that each party has to model the funding costs of the other party, whose Treasury policies may
be unknown to the calculating party. A possible solution is considering the CDS/bond basis
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as a proxy for the unknown funding spreads. Alternatively, we could approximate funding
spreads with the funding spreads of the calculating party by exchanging funding and investing
rates, since positive cash flows for one party are negative cash flows for the other party and
vice versa.
When dealing with contracts cleared via CCPs we have to consider also the impact of the
margin period of risk. Thus, we extend the definition of close-out amount by introducing a
delay in the default procedure. In such a case we need to include in the value of the close-out
also the cash flows occurring during the delay. Accordingly, we define the close-out amount
not as a mark-to-market evaluated at the first default time, but as a mark to market P&L
ετ+δ(τ, T ) observed at the end of the default procedure τ + δ inclusive of delay δ and starting
from the first default time τ . Thus, we write
ετ+δ(τ, T ) :=
∫ T
τ
Eh[D(τ, u; c)Π(u, u+ du) | Gτ+δ] . (18)
Furthermore, it is useful to extend the definition of the close-out amount for any time t
and s with t ≤ s ≤ T as given by
εs(t, T ) :=
∫ T
t
Eh[D(t, u; c)Π(u, u+ du) | Gs]
which is equal to the previous definition when evaluated in t = τ and s = τ + δ, and we are
able to write
εt(t, T ) =
∫ T
t
Eh[D(t, u; f) (Π(u, u+ du) + (fu − cu)εu(u, T )du) | Gt]
for any funding rate ft.
We can substitute equation (18) into equation (17), by taking into account the above
results, to obtain
Vt = εt(t, T ) (19)
+
∫ T
t
duEh
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u; f)((fN
C
u − cu)NCu + (fN
I
u − cu)N Iu) | Gt
]
−
∫ T
t
Eh
[
1{τ∈du}1{τC<τI+δ}LGDCD(t, u; f)∆
C,+
u+δ | Gt
]
−
∫ T
t
Eh
[
1{τ∈du}1{τI<τC+δ}LGDID(t, u; f)∆
I,−
u+δ | Gt
]
where we define the gap risk measured on counterparty’s default ∆Cτ+δ and on investor’s
default ∆Iτ+δ as
∆Cτ+δ := ετ+δ(τ, T )−NCτ− −Mτ− , ∆Iτ+δ := ετ+δ(τ, T )−N Iτ− −Mτ− . (20)
The pricing equation (19) can be viewed as a generalization of the usual CVA/DVA pricing
equation, see for instance Brigo et al. [2013]. Indeed we can define a collateralized CVA/DVA
adjustment in presence of funding and hedging costs by subtracting εt(t, T ) from both sides.
Yet, the above equation is only a formal description of a BSDE problem, and it cannot be
solved explicitly, since rates and collateral accounts on the right-hand side may depend on
the future prices V of the derivative itself, see Section 4.2 below.
In the following section we focus on gap risk and on how we can reduce it by suitably
defining the variation and initial margins.
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3.9 Gap Risk and Margining Procedures
Gap risk may be almost instantaneous, building on strong contagion after a default, or may
build during the margin period of risk, due to high volatility of the underlying mark to market.
The relevance of gap risk depends on the asset class we are considering. For instance, as shown
in Brigo et al. [2011a], CDS prices are heavily affected by instantaneous gap risk, since the
mark-to-market of a CDS jumps when one of the counterparties defaults. This jump occurs
because of the dependence between the default time of the CDS reference name and the
default time of the defaulted counterparty. The initial margins requested by a CCP protect
from such risk, while the variation margins protect from the loss of exposure as measured at
the last margin call.
We can highlight the different contributions hinted above by rewriting the gap risk def-
inition in the following form (we omit the superscripts on gap risks and initial margins to
lighten notations).
∆τ+δ = ∆
Mismatch
τ− + ∆
Contagion
τ + ∆
MtM
τ+δ (21)
where we define three components of the gap risk according to three different fixing times: (i)
just before the default event, (ii) the default event, and (iii) the end of the default procedure.
We list them below in detail.
1. The component of the gap risk due to a mismatch between the variation margin account
and the value of the close-out amount, if it was calculated just before the default event,
is given by
∆Mismatchτ− := ετ−(τ, T )−Mτ− . (22)
2. The component of the gap risk due to an instantaneous contagion effect at default time
is given by
∆Contagionτ := ετ (τ, T )− ετ−(τ, T )−NContagionτ− . (23)
3. The component of the gap risk due to a movement in the mark-to-market of the close-
out amount between the default event and the end of the default procedure is given
by
∆MtMτ+δ := ετ+δ(τ, T )− ετ (τ, T )−NMtMτ− . (24)
where we can split the initial margin contribution into two parts:
Nτ− := N
Contagion
τ− +N
MtM
τ− .
This partition is implicit but we will make it explicit in the following examples on interest rate
derivatives. We observe that both the variation and the initial margin are fixed just before
the default event, namely at τ−, as the mismatch term of gap risk is fixed, while the contagion
and the mark-to-market terms of gap risk are fixed at later times, respectively at τ and at
τ + δ. Thus, we are able only to drop the mismatch term of gap risk by a suitable definition
of the variation margin, while the other two terms can be reduced but not eliminated.
In the following section we will discuss how to define the variation and the initial margins
so as to reduce the gap-risk contributions in the case of interest rate derivatives cleared by a
CCP or traded in a bilateral contract under CSA.
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4 Pricing Interest-Rate Derivatives under Bilateral CSA or
CCP Clearing
In the previous section we derived the pricing equation inclusive of counterparty credit risk
and funding costs for a generic derivative in presence of variation and initial margins by taking
into account the margin period of risk. Here, we wish to specialize the problem to the case
of interest-rate derivatives. As a first step we introduce a collateralization procedure suitable
for interest-rate derivatives, then we discuss how to model the rates appearing in the pricing
equations, so as to write a pricing equation we can numerically solve.
4.1 Variation and Initial Margin Estimates
The variation margin can be defined to include all the derivative cash flows with the exception
of those depending on the funding costs of the counterparties. In the case of interest-rate
derivatives cleared by a CCP, we usually find contractual rules explaining how to calculate
the variation margin by discounting the derivative coupons at an official rate issued by the
CCP at the end of each trading day. Here, we assume that such rate is the collateral rate ct,
so that we can define
Mt
.
= εt(t, T ) (25)
and drop the mismatch gap-risk term, namely we get
∆Mismatch,C
τ− = ∆
Mismatch,I
τ− = 0 .
Remark 4.1. (Partial Collateralization in Bilateral Trades). In bilateral trades when
collateralization is not full, it can be useful to define the variation margin as in Pallavicini
and Brigo [2013] where it is set equal to a fraction αt of the close-out, namely we define
Mpartialt
.
= αtεt(t, T ) (26)
We employ this definition in the numerical examples of Section 5 to show the transition
between non-collateralized and (fully-)collateralized deals.
On the other hand, initial margins can be estimated by the CCP according to the pre-
vailing market conditions and the expected maturity of the portfolio. The gap risk arising
from the mark-to-market term is usually analyzed in terms of historical Value-at-Risk (VaR)
or Expected Shortfall (ES) estimates. Furthermore, CCPs can apply multipliers to initial
margins at their discretion. For instance, they can call additional margins to cover potential
losses arising from pricing impacts in executing large trades in case of a member default, or
when a member suffers a downgrade.
Here, we are interested in pricing interest-rate derivatives. According to the analysis of
Brigo et al. [2011b] we can safely disregard the contagion component of gap risk for interest-
rate derivatives. Technically, this is to say that an interest rate exposure does not jump by
contagion at default of a counterparty. Thus, we can assume that
∆Contagion,Cτ
.
= ∆Contagion,Iτ
.
= 0
and
NContagion,C
τ−
.
= NContagion,I
τ−
.
= 0 . (27)
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so that
NCτ− = N
MtM,C
τ− , N
I
τ− = N
MtM,I
τ− .
Then we can calculate the initial margin posted to protect from mark-to-market move-
ments as the protection against the worst movement of the contract due to market risk within
δ days at a confidence level q according to some risk measure, typically Value at Risk or Ex-
pected Shortfall. Again we use the rate issued by the CCP to calculate mark-to-market and
P&L. For instance, if we assume as risk measure the Value at Risk (VaR) of the price variation
of the contract we obtain that the initial margins NCt and N
I
t can be defined as given by
NMtM,Ct
.
= inf {x ≥ 0 : P{ εt+δ(t, T )− εt(t, T ) < x | Ft } > q}
and only for bilateral contracts under CSA
NMtM,It
.
= sup {x ≤ 0 : P{ εt+δ(t, T )− εt(t, T ) > x | Ft } > q}
where the P is the physical probability measure, and we have modified the VaR definition
to ensure that the initial margin is posted only by the one counterparty at time. In a CCP
cleared contract we consider only the initial margin posted by the client, while in a bilateral
transaction the proposal of ISDA ISDA [2013] states that each counterparty has his own initial
margin to post to the other one without any netting assumption. An analogous definition
can be formulated with ES replacing VaR in the above equation.
In the following we discuss numerical examples, and we need to evaluate the initial margin
account within the simulation of the pricing equation. Thus, we face the problem of evaluating
a quantile under the physical measure P while simulating under the pricing measure Qh. Our
proposal is to approximate the calculation by replacing the above recipe for the initial margin
calculated in the physical measure by the corresponding one in the pricing measure, namely
we define
NMtM,Ct
.
= inf
{
x ≥ 0 : Qh{ εt+δ(t, T )− εt(t, T ) < x | Ft } > q
}
(28)
and only for bilateral contracts under CSA
NMtM,It
.
= sup
{
x ≤ 0 : Qh{ εt+δ(t, T )− εt(t, T ) > x | Ft } > q
}
(29)
where we can take the expectation conditional on the default-free market filtration, since for
interest-rate payoffs we do not have a dependency of the payout on default times of reference
names.
We can further approximate the initial margin in order to speed up the pricing simulation.
Indeed, we can implement a moment matching technique to approximate the conditional
probability, appearing in the VaR calculation, with a normal distribution
NMtM,Ct ≈ Φ−10,νt(q) (30)
where Φµ,ν is the cumulative distribution function of a normal distribution with mean µ and
standard deviation ν, and where the mean and variance are calculated under the pricing
measure w.r.t. the default-free market filtration, and are given by
µt := 0 , ν
2
t := Var
h[ εt+δ(t, T ) | Ft] .
Only for bilateral contracts under CSA we can accordingly define the initial margin posted
by the investor as given by
NMtM,It ≈ −NMtM,Ct . (31)
being zero in the CCP case.
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4.2 Collateralized Hedging Instruments and Funding Costs
The money market usually quotes the prices of collateralized instruments, such as standard-
ized interest-rate swaps (IRS) and overnight indexed swaps (OIS). In particular, a daily
collateralization procedure is assumed, so that CSA contracts require that the collateral ac-
count be remunerated at the overnight rate (et). The same happens for quoted instruments
sensitive to credit spreads of defaultable names, such as the credit default swaps (CDS). Such
instruments are usually used as hedging instruments3.
When we hedge a derivative contract by means of collateralized hedging instruments we
must consider also the cash flows needed to implement their collateral procedure, as we are
already doing for the collateral procedure of the derivative itself. In our framework this
can be accomplished by setting the borrowing and lending rates, used to trade the hedging
instruments, equal to their collateralization rate, as shown in Pallavicini and Brigo [2013].
Thus, we can write
ht
.
= et . (32)
Then, we can discuss funding rates, namely the rates used to borrow and lend cash. We
assume that in general they can be different, and we select the borrowing or the lending rate
according to the sign of the netting set that the Treasury assigns to the derivative contract.
Since we are using collateralized hedging instruments, we consider as a single funding netting
set the set defined by the need for cash of both the derivative position and its hedge, so that
we can define the funding rate as given by
ft
.
= f+t 1{Ft+CHt >0} + f
−
t 1{Ft+CHt <0} ,
where CHt is the collateral account of the hedging instruments and F is the cash component of
the hedge portfolio, which is defined in equation (2). Here, we use the symbol f+t to represent
the funding borrowing rate, while f−t is the lending rate.
For example, as we have seen above, in the Black Scholes model Ht is the value of the
delta position in the stock, whereas Ft is the value of the remaining cash component of the
replication. Furthermore, in the case of interest-rate derivatives, where we can assume that
hedging instruments are collateralized in a way that perfectly matches the mark-to-market
over the discrete time margining dates, we have CHt = Ht, leading to
ft = f
+
t 1{Vt>Mt} + f
−
t 1{Vt<Mt} . (33)
Remark 4.2. Fundamental nonlinearity of the pricing operator in funding inclusive
valuation. This last equation above is quite important. It shows that the rates f appearing in
our pricing problem depend on the future size of the claim value V compared to the collateral
M , and in turn we know the price value V will depend on future values of the funding cash
flows ϕ depending on those same rates f . This introduces a fundamental nonlinearity at the
level of pricing operators or expectations in the valuation problem, a nonlinearity that was not
there at the pure credit valuation adjustment (CVA) level, since CVA induces nonlinearity in
the payout but not on the pricing operators or expectations.
We conclude this section by considering the collateral rates usually adopted by CCPs or
by bilateral contracts under CSA (in particular when a SCSA is adopted). In these contracts
3A name cannot sell protection on himself by means of his own CDS, so that he must implement a different
hedging strategy in the practice. See Brigo et al. [2013] for a discussion with examples.
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the collateral rate is usually equal to the overnight rate for both counterparties. Thus, in the
following we can write
ct
.
= et . (34)
It is also useful to express the funding and investing rates as a liquidity basis over the
overnight rate et, so that we have
f+t
.
= et + `
+
t , f
−
t
.
= et + `
−
t , (35)
while for the funding rates used for the initial margin accounts we have
fN
C
t
.
= et + `
NC
t , f
NI
t
.
= et + `
NI
t . (36)
The liquidity bases `+t , `
−
t , `
NC and `N
I
can be obtained from the market from the bond/CDS
basis or modelled according to a stylized version of the Treasury liquidity policy as described
in Pallavicini and Brigo [2013]. In the latter case the liquidity bases may be related to the
default intensity and/or to credit worthiness of the collateral portfolio used by the Treasury
for funding.
In this paper we assume that the liquidity bases are related to the credit spreads of the
calculating party, namely to the pre-default intensities of the two names λIt and λ
C
t , discussed
later in equation (40), via some multipliers β± ∈ [0, 1]. The multipliers depend on the
Treasury policy, and we assume them to be deterministic constants in this initial analysis.
We present two different cases which we analyze in Section 5 in detail, according to the
identity of the calculating party. Here a complete notation would require us to add a further
index to bases and rates to specify which entity (”I” or ”C”) is doing the calculation. To
avoid cumbersome notation we omit this further index.
• Prices calculated by the investor.
`+t
.
= β+λIt , `
−
t
.
= β−λIt , `
NC
t
.
= 0 , `N
I
t
.
= `+t . (37)
• Prices calculated by the counterparty.
`+t
.
= β+λCt , `
−
t
.
= β−λCt , `
NC
t
.
= `−t , `
NI
t
.
= 0 . (38)
4.3 Dealing with Default Dependencies and Delays
We plug into the pricing equation (19) the estimates of the variation and initial margin, given
by equations (25) ad (27), along with the modelling choices on market rates of equations (34),
(32), (33). We obtain
Vt = εt(t, T )
+
∫ T
t
duEe
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u; f)(`N
C
u N
C
u + `
NI
u N
I
u) | Gt
]
−
∫ T
t
Ee
[
1{τ∈du}1{τC<τI+δ}LGDCD(t, u; f)(∆
C
u+δ)
+ | Gt
]
−
∫ T
t
Ee
[
1{τ∈du}1{τI<τC+δ}LGDID(t, u; f)(∆
I
u+δ)
− | Gt
]
.
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When the close-out amount is F-adapted, as in the case of interest-rate derivatives, we
can simplify the pricing equation given by (19) by switching to the default-free market fil-
tration. By following the filtration switching formula in Brigo and Mercurio [2006], or the
more thorough analysis in Bielecki et al. [2008], we introduce for any Gt-adapted process Xt
a unique Ft-adapted process X˜t, defined such that
1{τ>t}Xt = 1{τ>t}X˜t.
Thus, we can write the pre-default price process as given by
1{τ>t}V˜t = 1{τ>t}εt(t, T )
+
∫ T
t
duEe
[
1{u<τ}D(t, u; f)(`N
C
u N
C
u + `
NI
u N
I
u) | Gt
]
−
∫ T
t
Ee
[
1{τ∈du}1{τC<τI+δ}LGDCD(t, u; f)(∆
C
u+δ)
+ | Gt
]
−
∫ T
t
Ee
[
1{τ∈du}1{τI<τC+δ}LGDID(t, u; f)(∆
I
u+δ)
− | Gt
]
where we recall that in our case also the margin accounts and the gap risks are F-adapted
processes.
Our intention is to study the impact of the liquidity bases on interest-rate derivative prices
cleared by a CCP, and to extend the analysis of Brigo et al. [2011b] on the dependency of
derivative prices w.r.t. changes in the correlation between market and credit risks (wrong-way
risk). In this first work on CCPs we develop such analysis without considering a dependence
between the default times if not through their spreads, or more precisely by assuming that
the default times are F-conditionally independent.
Thus, we can write for any time t and u such that t ≤ u
Ee
[
1{τ∈du}1{τC<τI+δ}φu | Gt
]
= 1{τ>t}duEe
[
λδ,Cu D(t, u;λ)φu | Ft
]
and
Ee
[
1{τ∈du}1{τI<τC+δ}φu | Gt
]
= 1{τ>t}duEe
[
λδ,Iu D(t, u;λ)φu | Ft
]
where φu is F-adapted and measurable at u. Furthermore, we introduce the pre-default
intensities of each name modified to take into account the possibility that the surviving name
defaults within the margin period of risk
1{τ>t}λ
δ,C
t := 1{τ>t}λ
C
t + 1{τ>t}λ
I
t
(
1−D(t, t+ δ;λC)) (39)
1{τ>t}λ
δ,I
t := 1{τ>t}λ
I
t + 1{τ>t}λ
C
t
(
1−D(t, t+ δ;λI))
where we define the pre-default intensity λIt of the clearing member and the pre-default
intensity λCt of the client as
1{τI>t}λ
I
t dt := Qe{ τI ∈ dt | τI > t,Ft } (40)
1{τC>t}λ
C
t dt := Qe{ τC ∈ dt | τC > t,Ft }
along with their sum λt
1{τ>t}λt := 1{τ>t}λIt + 1{τ>t}λ
C
t (41)
and we omit the tilde over the intensity symbols to lighten the notation.
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4.4 The Pricing Equation
If we consider interest-rate derivatives we can apply the above results and switch to the
default-free market filtration Ft. We can do that since the defaultable names are only the
clearing member and the client, so that when a default occurs the credit-risk-free close-out
amount is F-adapted.
A different situation occurs for credit derivatives. In this case the close-out amount is
fully G-adapted since the reference names of the credit derivatives may survive the default
event and we must consider them even in a credit-risk-free close-out evaluation. We address
the readers to Brigo et al. [2011a] for a discussion of the case of credit default swaps.
In the following section we consider the case of an F-adapted close-out, and we derive the
pricing equations for interest-rate derivatives.
4.4.1 Switching to the Default-Free Market Filtration
Hence, since the pre-default processes are uniquely defined by their values up to the default
event, we switch to the default-free market filtration Ft, and we obtain
V˜t = εt(t, T ) (42)
+
∫ T
t
duEe
[
D(t, u; f + λC + λI)(`N
C
u N
C
u + `
NI
u N
I
u) | Ft
]
−
∫ T
t
duEe
[
λδ,Cu LGDC D(t, u; f + λ
C + λI)(εu+δ(u, T )− εu(u, T )−NCu )+ | Ft
]
−
∫ T
t
duEe
[
λδ,Iu LGDI D(t, u; f + λ
C + λI)(εu+δ(u, T )− εu(u, T )−N Iu)− | Ft
]
with
εs(t, T ) =
∫ T
t
Ee[D(t, u; e)Π(u, u+ du) | Fs]
where the initial margin posted by the counterparty (or the client in the CCP case) is defined
as
NCt = Φ
−1
0,νt
(q) , ν2t = Var
h[ εt+δ(t, T ) | Ft]
while the initial margin posted by the investor in bilateral contracts under CSA is
N It = −NCt
being zero in the CCP case. Moreover, we have
λδ,Ct = λ
C
t + λ
I
t
(
1−D(t, t+ δ;λC)) , λδ,It = λIt + λCt (1−D(t, t+ δ;λI))
along with
ft = et + `
+
t 1{V˜t>εt(t,T )} + `
−
t 1{V˜t<εt(t,T )}
where the free parameters to be calibrated on the market are the overnight rate et, and the
default intensities of the two names λCt and λ
I
t . The liquidity bases `
+
t , `
−
t , `
NC
t and `
NI
t are
linked to market data by means of equations (37) and (38), while the margin period of risk
δ and the confidence level q of the risk measure used to estimate the initial margin can be
inferred from contract documentation.
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The final result is a pricing equation where the cash flows of the derivative are discounted
at the collateral rate adjusted for the funding costs of the initial margin and for the CVA/DVA
terms. In the following sections we introduce a dynamical model to simulate the overnight
rate, along with the liquidity bases, and the default intensities. Notice that the choice of
the liquidity bases appearing in equation (42) depends on which is the party performing the
calculation. In the following we select a different set of bases according to the party.
Furthermore, since the funding rates depend on the derivative price, namely the same
expectation we are trying to compute, equation (42) cannot be used to explicitly evaluate
the price of the contract as a straightforward expectation. This equation should rather be
interpreted as the solution of a BSDE with terminal condition at contract maturity T as
described in Ma et al. [2002] and similarly to what we have seen earlier, with (7) becoming
the BSDE (10). In the next section we describe the numerical scheme used to solve the BSDE.
4.4.2 Numerical Scheme for the BSDE
We calculate the prices by means equation (42). We solve the equation in terms of the
following implicit iterative problem defined on the time grid {t = t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn = T} as
done in Pallavicini et al. [2011]
Yti = E
e
[
Yti+1D(ti, ti+1; f + λ
C + λI) | Fti
]
+
∫ ti+1
ti
Ee
[
D(ti, u; f + λ
C + λI) dpiu | Fti
]
with terminal condition
Ytn = 0
where we define the price process Yt as
Yt := V˜t − εt(t, T ) (43)
and the coupon process pit as given by
dpit := `
NC
t N
C
t dt− λδ,Ct Ee
[
LGDC(εt+δ(t, T )− εt(t, T )−NCt )+ | Ft
]
dt (44)
+ `N
I
t N
I
t dt− λδ,It Ee
[
LGDI(εt+δ(t, T )− εt(t, T )−N It )− | Ft
]
dt
It is important that the fundamental nonlinearity induced by the funding problem has disap-
peared from the coupon process pi, since this does not depend on rates f for example, and as
such does not depend on the future values of the very same value V we are trying to compute.
See Remark 4.2. This important feature of our coupon process is a byproduct of our specific
choices for ε, M and ` in the interest rate case and on our simplifying assumptions on the
treasury netting sets for funding. The remaining presence of f in the discount term will be
dealt with numerically now.
In order to implement numerically the problem we build a Euler discretization as in Ma
et al. [2002], and we write
Yti = (1− gti(Yti)∆ti)Ee
[
Yti+1 | Fti
]
+ ∆piti
where we make explicit the dependency on the mark-to-market value of the contract and we
define the rate
gti(Yti) := eti + λ
C
ti + λ
I
ti + `
+
ti
1{Yti>0} + `
−
ti
1{Yti<0} .
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Then, we follow Ma et al. [2002] by solving the coupled pair of equations by a fixed-point
technique, leading to the following explicit scheme
Yti =
(
1− gti
(
Ee
[
Yti+1 | Fti
])
∆ti
)
Ee
[
Yti+1 | Fti
]
+ ∆piti . (45)
We can reduce the variance of the simulation by means of control variate variables based
on the price of the contract without funding costs. We define the funding-cost-free pre-default
price as given by
V˜ 0t := εt(t, T ) (46)
+
∫ T
t
duEe
[
D(t, u; e+ λC + λI)(`N
C
u N
C
u + `
NI
u N
I
u) | Ft
]
−
∫ T
t
duEe
[
λδ,Cu LGDC D(t, u; e+ λ
C + λI)(εu+δ(u, T )− εu(u, T )−NCu )+ | Ft
]
−
∫ T
t
duEe
[
λδ,Iu LGDI D(t, u; e+ λ
C + λI)(εu+δ(u, T )− εu(u, T )−N Iu)− | Ft
]
This price process can be evaluated directly by calculating the expectation, since the right-
hand side does not depend on V˜ 0t . The problem we had pointed out in Remark 4.2 does not
hold for this price process. This is basically because pi is free from future values of V and
now also the discounting, having been replaced by e, is free from future V ’s. Yet, we can
evaluate this price also by means of the numerical scheme of equation (45). If we introduce
the funding-cost-free price process Y 0t as
Y 0t := V˜
0
t − εt(t, T ) ,
we get
Y 0ti =
(
1− (eti + λCti + λIti)∆ti
)
Ee
[
Y 0ti+1 | Fti
]
+ ∆piti .
We can solve for the coupon process piti the above equation, and substitute the resulting
expression into equation (45), to obtain a numerical scheme to evaluate the funding valuation
adjustment process Xt := Yt − Y 0t . We obtain
Xti := Eeti
[
Xti+1
]
Yti := V˜ 0ti − εti(ti, T ) + Xti
Xti = Xti − Yti gti(Yti) ∆ti
(47)
with terminal condition Xtn = 0. We can solve iteratively the scheme, and we obtain the
present value of the funding valuation adjustment process, namely Xt0 , which allows to cal-
culate the derivative price as
V˜t0 = V˜
0
t0 +Xt0 . (48)
4.5 Price Decomposition: CVA, DVA, FVA, and MVA
In our previous works we pointed out that the funding inclusive price, in general, is not really
separable in clearcut components depending only on credit risk, debit risk and funding risk,
see for example Pallavicini et al. [2011, 2012]. However, under the simplifying assumptions
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we adopted here in the interest rate case, we have now approached a specific situation where
separability can be partially achieved.
Indeed, the control-variate procedure highlights a simple way to decompose the derivative
price in five pieces with financial meaning. We re-write equation (48) by plugging into it
equation (46) to discuss the terms. We obtain
V˜t = MtMt + CVAt + DVAt + MVAt + FVAt (49)
where the five terms are
1. The mark-to-market of the replacement deal used to evaluate the close-out amount,
which in our settings corresponds to the price of the contract in the hypothetical settings
of complete ”perfect” collateralization (no gap risk, continuous updating), namely
MtMt := εt(t, T ) .
2. The funding-cost-free bilateral CVA adjustment, which is due to the default of the client
(”C“), and it is corrected for the possibility of default of the clearing member during
the margin period of risk. The adjustment is equal to
CVAt := −
∫ T
t
duEe
[
λδ,Cu LGDC D(t, u; e+ λ
C + λI)(εu+δ(u, T )− εu(u, T )−NCu )+ | Ft
]
.
3. The funding-cost-free bilateral DVA adjustment, which is due to the default of the
clearing member (”I“), and it is corrected for the possibility of default of the client
during the margin period of risk. The adjustment is equal to
DVAt := −
∫ T
t
duEe
[
λδ,Iu LGDI D(t, u; e+ λ
C + λI)(εu+δ(u, T )− εu(u, T )−N Iu)− | Ft
]
.
4. The funding costs of posting the initial margin. We can call them the margin valuation
adjustment, or MVA, and we define it as
MVAt :=
∫ T
t
duEe
[
D(t, u; e+ λC + λI)(NCu `
NC
u +N
I
u`
NI
u ) | Ft
]
.
5. The funding costs to implement the hedging strategy by taking into account the cash
obtained from the re-hypothecation of the variation margin. This term cannot be
directly calculated by means of an expectation, but it requires the numerical solution
of a BSDE. It is given by
FVAt := Xt
where Xt is calculated by means of the numerical iterative scheme (47).
We should point out that in some contexts it may make sense to include MVA into FVA, as
the cost of margining is strictly speaking a funding cost. We maintained distinction between
the two for clarity.
The above decomposition is valid either for CCP cleared contracts or for bilateral trades,
also under Standard CSA with the relevant definitions of initial margin accounts and liquidity
bases. The only limitation is given by the selection of an F-adapted close-out amount, and
the F-conditional independence of default times. When one of these requirements is not met,
we need to use directly equation (19) to price the derivative, without switching to the default
free market filtration.
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Figure 4: Positive and negative exposures of collateralized ten-year receiver IRS traded at par,
which we use as example in the numerical discussion. Collateral variation margin matches
the mark to market at the discrete margining dates. There is no instantaneous gap risk. We
still have margin period gap risk. The notional is one Euro and prices in basis points.
5 Numerical Results and Discussion
In this section we apply the pricing equation (42) to the case of an interest-rate swap (IRS)
cleared by a CCP. In particular, we adopt the numerical scheme (47), and we analyze receiver
and payer IRS with a maturity of ten years with Euro market conventions. Our goal is
studying the impact of the liquidity basis and of the correlation between market and credit
risks (wrong-way risk).
5.1 Modelling the Market and Default Risks
The pricing equation (42) depends on the interest-rates, the liquidity basis, and the default
intensities. In this numerical section to simplify the discussion we work in a single-curve
framework. However, the generalization to a multiple-curve setup is straightforward and can
be accomplished, for instance, by following the model presented in Moreni and Pallavicini
[2010, 2013] and used later in Pallavicini and Brigo [2013].
We model interest-rates under the pricing measure of equation (42) as in Brigo et al.
[2011c] as a two-factor shifted Hull-White model, calibrated to swaption volatilities. Thus,
we can write
et := ϕ(t) +
2∑
i=1
xit
where ϕ(t) is a deterministic function of time used to calibrate the initial term structure of
zero-coupon rates, and
dxit = −aixit dt+ σi dW it , xi0 = 0 (50)
where ai and σi are positive constants, and W it ’s are standard Brownian motions. Since we
are working in a single-curve framework we can derive all the other market rates from the
overnight rate. Calibration details can be found in Brigo et al. [2011c], while calibration
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Figure 5: Left: default intensity in ”M“ market setting as a zero rate (solid line) along with
distribution quantiles at 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75 level. Right: default intensity in ”H“ market
setting as in central panel. See market data settings in the appendix.
data are reported in Tables 1 and 2. Here, we show in Figure 4 the resulting exposures
for a collateralized ten-year IRS traded at par, with collateral matching mark to market on
margining dates, which we use as example in the numerical discussion.
We model the default intensities according to a one-factor shifted Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model
as given by
λkt := y
k
t + ψ
k(t) , k ∈ {I, C}
where ψk(t) is a deterministic function of time used to calibrate the initial term structure of
credit spreads, and
dykt = κ
k(µk − ykt ) dt+ νk
√
ykt dW
k
t (51)
where κk, µk, νk and yk0 are positive constants, and W
k
t is a standard Brownian motion. Since
we do not have a liquid market for CDS options, we use as reference calibration set the initial
term structure and the options used in Brigo et al. [2011c] to calibrate default intensities.
Calibration data are reported in Tables 4 and 5 for the ”mid-risk“ (or ”M“) market settings,
while in the right panel of figure 5 we illustrate the resulting default-intensity distribution.
In Tables 6 and 7 and in the left panel of figure 5 we report the same data for the ”high-risk“
(or ”H“) market settings.
The four Brownian motions are correlated by means of a correlation matrix with elements
ρij defined as
d〈W i,W j〉t = ρij dt
It is useful to calculate the correlation among the overnight rate and each default intensity,
since we use it in the numerical discussion. We get
ρ¯k :=
d〈e, λk〉t√
d〈e, e〉t d〈λk, λk〉t
=
∑2
i=1 σ
iρik√∑2
i=1
∑2
j=1 σ
iσjρij
(52)
In the following sections we price a ten-year interest-rate swap in different credit and
liquidity settings. We start from a bilateral trade without initial margin and with initial
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Figure 6: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS (left) and payer IRS (right) with a high-risk
parameter set for the counterparty and a mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“).
In each panel the black continuous line represents a funding policy with the same rate for
funding and investing (β+ = β−), while the dashed red lines represent funding policies with
asymmetric rates (β+ ≥ β−) for different choices of the investing rate. The x-axis shows the
funding multiplier β+. For each red plot, the multiplier β− is taken equal to the value of β+
at the intersection with the black line. Prices are inclusive of CVA and DVA and they are
expressed in basis points with a notional of one Euro.
margins as in SCSA. Then we focus on CCP cleared contracts. The calculations are made
with the made settings of Brigo et al. [2011b], so that prices without funding costs can be
found on that paper, which we reproduce in the appendix.
5.2 Interest-Rate Swap: bilateral trades without margining
In this section we investigate the impact of funding costs in a bilateral trade without collat-
eralization, as in deals a bank may close with a corporate counterparty without a CSA. The
payoff we discuss is a ten year interest-rate swap, which we analyze both in the receiver and
payer variants. The strike of these swaps is chosen so that the price is zero when credit and
liquidity adjustments are disregarded (full collateralization case). The recovery rates for both
parties in the trade are set to 40%.
We start by pricing our reference IRS under different funding policies by assuming that
there is no correlation among credit and market risks, namely that ρ¯C = ρ¯I = 0 in equation
(52). In particular, we change the liquidity multipliers of equations (37) and (38) to simulate
the presence of different levels of funding fees along with the possibility of asymmetric rates.
In Figure 6 we show the results with high-risk parameter set for the counterparty and mid-risk
parameter set for the investor (”H/M“). See the appendix for full details on market data.
The impact of funding rates seems to show a roughly linear pattern with respect to
the value of the funding and investing rates for the market settings used for the calculations.
However, if we extend our analysis to different settings we can observe more complex patterns.
In Figure 7 we show the results with mid-risk parameter set for the counterparty and high-
risk parameter set for the investor (”M/H“). In this way the funding costs are higher and
D. Brigo and A. Pallavicini: A Unified Pricing Framework 37
Figure 7: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS (left) and payer IRS (right) with a mid-risk
parameter set for the counterparty and a high-risk parameter set for the investor (”M/H“).
All else as in the caption of Figure 6.
non-linear patterns appear.
In presence of asymmetric rates, namely when the funding (borrowing) rate is greater
than the investing (lending) rate, we have that the price of a long position plus the price of
the analogous short position is not identically zero, since the pricing operator is not linear
in this case, leading to differences between the price of a portfolio and the portfolio of the
prices. Such differences may be interpreted, possibly, as the bid-ask spread for the position.
See Bergman [1995] or Mercurio [2013] for a discussion. We observe such effects in Figure 8
where we calculate the sum of the price of the receiver position plus the price of shorting the
same positions for the ”H/M“ and ”M/H“ market settings respectively. The resulting bid-ask
spread is zero when the funding rate is equal to the investing rate, while it grows as soon as
the difference between these two rates increases.
Now, we can move onto analyzing the impact of correlations among market and credit
risks. We consider a receiver payoff both in ”H/M“ and ”M/H“ market settings. We maintain
as funding policy β+ = β− = 1. The results are shown in Figure 9. We observe two interesting
features: (i) funding costs may be dominated by funding benefits (left panel for negative
correlations), and (ii) funding costs may be a relevant part of credit/liquidity adjustments
(right panel for positive correlations).
Detailed sets of prices for the market setting ”H/M” for different funding policies and
different correlation among market and credit risks are listed in Tables 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 in
the appendix.
5.3 Interest-Rate Swap: bilateral CSA trades with margining
We move onto analyzing collateralization. We still consider a bilateral trade but under a
CSA. In particular, we discuss the setting presented in equation (42) with the possibility of
an incomplete collateralization, as discussed in Remark 4.1, when the initial margin is not
present. Detailed numerical results can be found in Tables 13 and 14. The recovery rates for
both parties in the trade are set to 40%.
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Figure 8: Bid-ask spread of a ten-year receiver IRS with a high-risk parameter set for the
counterparty and a mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) on the left, and the
opposite situation (”M/H“) on the right. In each panel the dashed red lines represent funding
policies with asymmetric rates (β+ ≥ β−) for different choices of the investing rate, that is set
at the intersection of the red line with the x axis. The x-axis shows the funding multiplier β+.
Prices are inclusive of CVA and DVA and they are expressed in basis points with a notional
of one Euro.
Figure 9: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS with a high-risk parameter set for the counterparty
and a mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) on the left, and the opposite situation
(”M/H“) on the right. In each panel the black continuous line represents the price inclusive
of CVA and DVA but not funding costs, with the dashed black lines representing separately
the CVA and the DVA contributions. The red continuous line is the price inclusive both
of credit and funding costs. Symmetric funding policy with β+ = β− = 1. On the x-axis
the correlation among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I). Prices in basis points with a
notional of one Euro.
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Figure 10: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS with a high-risk parameter set for the counterparty
and a mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“). On the left prices for different
collateralization fractions α (x-axis) without initial margin. On the right prices with α = 1
and initial margin posted at various confidence levels q (x-axis). In each panel the black
continuous line represents the price inclusive of CVA and DVA but not funding costs, with
the dashed black lines representing separately the CVA and the DVA contributions. The red
continuous line is the price inclusive both of credit and funding costs. Symmetric funding
policy with β+ = β− = 1. Correlation ρ¯ is zero. Prices in basis points with a notional of one
Euro.
We wish to compare the effectiveness of a collateralization based only on variation margins
with a collateralization based also on posting the initial margin. In the former case we should
face residual CVA/DVA effects coming either from an incomplete implementation of the
margining procedure or from a margin period of risk (we consider ten days in these examples),
while in the second case we have to pay for the costs of funding the initial margin.
In Figure 10 we show the prices for a receiver IRS in the “H/M” market settings, while
in Figure 11 the payer case is presented. If we consider equations (28) and (29), or their
approximations (30) and (31), we can see that the initial margin is used to cover extreme
events due to the default either of the investor or the counterparty. The quantity of initial
margin required to cover such extreme events at high confidence levels, as requested by ISDA
or by CCPs, may result in a sensitive amount of funding costs. As an example we show in
Figure 12 the amount of initial margin requested at inception for a receiver IRS in the “H/M”
market settings.
5.4 Interest-Rate Swap: CCP cleared contract
Our last example is on CCP cleared contracts. We focus on the client side and we consider
the amount of funding costs the client is paying to trade with the CCP. The recovery rate for
the client is set to 40%, while the recovery rate for the clearing member is set to 95%, so as
to model a possible loss resulting from the auction needed to move the trade to the backup
member in case of clearing member default.
Firstly, we show in Figure 13 the funding costs for different confidence levels by varying
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Figure 11: Prices of a ten-year payer IRS with a high-risk parameter set for the counterparty
and a mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“). All else as in the caption of Figure 10
Figure 12: Amount of initial margin requested at contract inception for a ten-year receiver
IRS with a high-risk parameter set for the counterparty and a mid-risk parameter set for the
investor (”H/M“). On the left the x-axis lists different confidence levels, while the curves
correspond to three different margin period of risks (1, 5 and 10 days). On the right the
x-axis lists different margin period of risks, while the curves correspond to three confidence
levels (68%, 95% and 99.7%). Symmetric funding policy with β+ = β− = 1. Correlation ρ¯ is
zero. Initial margin amounts are expressed in basis points with a notional of one Euro.
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Figure 13: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS traded with a CCP from the point of view of
the client with a mid-risk parameter set for the clearing member and a high-risk parameter
set for the client for initial margin posted at various confidence levels q. On the left we
display different correlations among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I). On the right
different levels of the volatility multiplier for interest rates. Symmetric funding policy with
β+ = β− = 1. Prices in basis points with a notional of one Euro.
either the correlation among market and credit risks or the volatility of interest rates. We
vary the volatility of interest rates by multiplying the volatilities σ1 and σ2 of equation (50)
by a positive constant, the “volatility multiplier”. The margin period of risk is five days.
We notice a very little dependence on the market/credit correlation, while modifying the
interest-rate volatilities has a much greater impact since the initial margin depends on the
conditional variance of the remaining cash flows of the contract.
A second experiment is to compare the same IRS contract cleared by the CCP or bilaterally
traded under CSA. We stay from the point of view of the same party (the CCP client in the
first case, the counterparty in the second case) and we assume a margin period of risk of
five days in the CCP trade, and of ten days in the bilateral case (these are typical values for
such scenarios). We assume that in both case the other party, namely the clearing member
in the CCP trade and the investor in the bilateral CSA trade, has the same credit quality.
The results are shown in Figure 14, whereas the valuation adjustments are tabulated in
Table 15. We can see that in the bilateral case a residual CVA and DVA is present unless
high confidence levels are used to calculate the initial margin, while in the CCP cleared case
the CVA is practically null. Furthermore, in the bilateral case there is a greater amount of
funding costs since a longer margin period of risk is used.
6 Conclusions and Further Developments
This paper introduces a pricing framework that is based only on market observables and
that consistently includes credit, collateral and funding effects in the pricing of a trade. We
discussed both the case of a bilateral CSA trade and the case of a trade cleared by a CCP.
We analyzed the detailed impact of credit, collateral (both initial and variation margins)
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Figure 14: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS traded with a CCP (or bilaterally) with a mid-risk
parameter set for the clearing member (investor) and a high-risk parameter set for the client
(counterparty) for initial margin posted at various confidence levels q. Prices are calculated
from the point of view of the client (counterparty). On the left the CCP trade, on the right
the bilateral trade. In each panel the black continuous line represents the price inclusive of
CVA and DVA but not funding costs, with the dashed black lines representing separately the
CVA and the DVA contributions. The red continuous line is the price inclusive both of credit
and funding costs. Symmetric funding policy with β+ = β− = 1. Correlation ρ¯ is zero. Prices
in basis points with a notional of one Euro.
and funding costs in both cases, inclusive of margin period of risk, gap risk and wrong way
risk. In particular, we analyzed the impact of funding costs on the initial margins required
by the clearing house. The pricing problem is solved numerically in some relevant cases, in
the interest rate swaps market, to show the impact of different ways of calculating the initial
margin and to seize the effect of correlations among market risk factors on one side and credit
risk and liquidity bases on the other side. A side benefit of our analysis is the characterization
of a case where our valuation equation can be separated into different valuation components
due to credit, funding and margining, leading to rigorous MVAs and FVAs on top of the
usual CVAs and DVAs. The separability result does not hold in general, as we pointed out in
earlier works. Further work includes a more realistic model for initial margins, the extension
of our analysis to different asset classes and a more detailed study of the funding policies and
rates applied by treasury departments in banks.
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Table 1: EUR zero-coupon continuously-compounded spot rates (ACT/360) observed on
May, 26 2009.
Date Rate Date Rate Date Rate
27-May-09 1.15% 28-Dec-09 1.49% 29-May-17 3.40%
28-May-09 1.02% 28-Jan-10 1.53% 28-May-18 3.54%
29-May-09 0.98% 26-Feb-10 1.56% 28-May-19 3.66%
04-Jun-09 0.93% 29-Mar-10 1.59% 28-May-21 3.87%
11-Jun-09 0.92% 28-Apr-10 1.61% 28-May-24 4.09%
18-Jun-09 0.91% 28-May-10 1.63% 28-May-29 4.19%
29-Jun-09 0.91% 30-May-11 1.72% 29-May-34 4.07%
28-Jul-09 1.05% 28-May-12 2.13% 30-May-39 3.92%
28-Aug-09 1.26% 28-May-13 2.48%
28-Sep-09 1.34% 28-May-14 2.78%
28-Oct-09 1.41% 28-May-15 3.02%
30-Nov-09 1.46% 30-May-16 3.23%
A Interest-Rate Market Data, CDS Terms Structures and Im-
plied Volatilities
We report in Table 1 the yield curve term structure, and in Table 2 swaption volatilities used
to calibrate the interest-rate and credit-spread dynamics in section 5.1. We list also in Table 4
and 6 the CDS term structures, and in Table 5 and 7 implied volatilities associated with the
model parameters used for the credit-spread dynamics in section 5.1.
B Pricing Interest-Rate Swaps
We report in the following tables the detailed numerical results discussed in Section 5. Tables
8, 9, 10 and 11 shows the prices of non-collateralized bilateral traded IRS with the market
setting ”H/M” for different funding policies and different correlation among market and credit
risks. Table 12 displays the impact of asymmetric rates on bid-ask spreads. Tables 13 and
14 list the prices of collateralized bilateral traded IRS with the market setting ”H/M” for
different variation margin fractions and different correlation among market and credit risks.
Table 15 shows the price decompositions for collateralized bilateral and CCP cleared IRS with
for different confidence levels for the valuation of initial margin..
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Table 2: Market at-the-money swaption volatilities observed on May, 26 2009. Each column
contains volatilities of swaptions of a given tenor b for different expiries t.
t ↓ / b→ 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
1y 42.8% 34.3% 31.0% 28.8% 27.7%
2y 28.7% 25.6% 24.1% 23.1% 22.4%
3y 23.5% 21.1% 20.4% 20.0% 19.7%
4y 19.9% 18.5% 18.2% 18.1% 18.0%
5y 17.6% 16.8% 16.9% 16.9% 17.0%
7y 15.4% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3% 15.3%
10y 14.2% 14.2% 14.2% 14.3% 14.4%
t ↓ / b→ 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1y 26.9% 26.5% 26.3% 26.2% 26.2%
2y 22.3% 22.2% 22.3% 22.4% 22.4%
3y 19.7% 19.7% 19.8% 19.9% 20.1%
4y 18.1% 18.1% 18.2% 18.2% 18.4%
5y 16.9% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.1%
7y 15.3% 15.3% 15.4% 15.5% 15.6%
10y 14.5% 14.6% 14.7% 14.8% 15.0%
Table 3: Mid and High risk credit spread parameters
y0 κ µ ν
Mid 0.01 0.80 0.02 0.20
High 0.03 0.50 0.05 0.50
Table 4: Mid risk initial CDS term structure
T 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
CDS Spread 92 104 112 117 120 122 124 125 126 127
Table 5: Mid risk CDS implied volatility associated to the parameters in Table 3. Each
column contains volatilities of CDS options of a given maturity T for different expiries t.
t ↓ / T → 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1y 52% 36% 27% 21% 17% 15% 13% 12% 11%
2y 39% 28% 21% 17% 14% 12% 11% 10%
3y 33% 24% 18% 15% 12% 11% 9%
4y 29% 21% 16% 13% 11% 9%
5y 26% 19% 15% 12% 10%
6y 24% 17% 13% 11%
7y 23% 16% 12%
8y 21% 15%
9y 19%
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Table 6: High risk initial CDS term structure
T 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
CDS Spread 234 244 248 250 252 252 254 253 254 254
Table 7: High risk CDS implied volatility associated to the parameters in Table 3. Each
column contains volatilities of CDS options of a given maturity T for different expiries t.
t ↓ / T → 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
1y 96% 69% 53% 43% 36% 31% 28% 26% 24%
2y 71% 52% 40% 32% 27% 24% 21% 19%
3y 59% 43% 33% 26% 22% 20% 18%
4y 51% 37% 28% 23% 20% 17%
5y 45% 33% 26% 21% 18%
6y 40% 30% 24% 19%
7y 40% 29% 22%
8y 36% 26%
9y 34%
Table 8: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS with unitary notional with high-risk parameter
set for the counterparty and mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) for different
correlations among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I), and different funding (β+) and
investing (β−) liquidity multipliers. Symmetric funding rates (β− = β+). Prices are in basis
points.
Receiver, H/M, β− = β+
ρ¯ ↓ / β+ → 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
-60% -33.54 -32.97 -32.43 -31.9 -31.39 -30.90
-40% -21.18 -20.89 -20.61 -20.34 -20.08 -19.82
-20% -10.18 -10.16 -10.14 -10.12 -10.10 -10.07
0% 0.28 0.05 -0.17 -0.38 -0.58 -0.77
20% 10.36 9.89 9.45 9.02 8.61 8.22
40% 18.01 17.35 16.73 16.13 15.55 14.99
60% 25.18 24.36 23.57 22.81 22.09 21.39
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Table 9: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS with unitary notional with high-risk parameter
set for the counterparty and mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) for different
correlations among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I), and different funding (β+) and
investing (β−) liquidity multipliers. Asymmetric funding rates (β− = 0). Prices are in basis
points.
Receiver, H/M, β− = 0
ρ¯ ↓ / β+ → 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
-60% -33.54 -33.86 -34.17 -34.48 -34.78 -35.08
-40% -21.18 -21.59 -21.99 -22.37 -22.76 -23.13
-20% -10.18 -10.68 -11.17 -11.65 -12.11 -12.57
0% 0.28 -0.33 -0.91 -1.48 -2.04 -2.58
20% 10.36 9.64 8.94 8.27 7.61 6.98
40% 18.01 17.18 16.37 15.59 14.84 14.11
60% 25.18 24.23 23.31 22.42 21.57 20.73
Table 10: Prices of a ten-year payer IRS with unitary notional with high-risk parameter
set for the counterparty and mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) for different
correlations among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I), and different funding (β+) and
investing (β−) liquidity multipliers. Symmetric funding rates (β− = β+). Prices are in basis
points.
Payer, H/M, β− = β+
ρ¯ ↓ / β+ → 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
-60% -20.72 -20.70 -20.67 -20.63 -20.58 -20.52
-40% -30.69 -30.43 -30.18 -29.92 -29.66 -29.40
-20% -40.55 -40.06 -39.58 -39.10 -38.64 -38.18
0% -51.08 -50.33 -49.6 -48.89 -48.19 -47.51
20% -61.49 -57.33 -53.79 -50.72 -48.02 -45.61
40% -74.78 -73.46 -72.17 -70.93 -69.72 -68.54
60% -87.83 -86.17 -84.57 -83.02 -81.52 -80.06
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Table 11: Prices of a ten-year payer IRS with unitary notional with high-risk parameter
set for the counterparty and mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) for different
correlations among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I), and different funding (β+) and
investing (β−) liquidity multipliers. Asymmetric funding rates (β− = 0). Prices are in basis
points.
Payer, H/M, β− = 0
ρ¯ ↓ / β+ → 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
-60% -20.72 -21.18 -21.61 -22.04 -22.44 -22.84
-40% -30.69 -31.05 -31.41 -31.75 -32.08 -32.40
-20% -40.55 -40.84 -41.12 -41.39 -41.66 -41.92
0% -51.08 -51.30 -51.51 -51.73 -51.93 -52.13
20% -61.49 -61.66 -61.82 -61.98 -62.14 -62.29
40% -74.78 -74.90 -75.01 -75.13 -75.24 -75.35
60% -87.83 -87.91 -87.99 -88.08 -88.16 -88.24
Table 12: Bid-ask spread for a ten-year receiver IRS with unitary notional with high-risk
parameter set for the counterparty and mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) for
different correlations among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I), and different funding
(β+) liquidity multipliers. Asymmetric funding rates (β+ ≥ β− = 0). Prices are in basis
points.
Receiver, H/M, β− = 0
ρ¯ ↓ / β+ → 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
-60% 0 1.26 2.49 3.69 4.87 6.02
-40% 0 1.11 2.20 3.26 4.30 5.32
-20% 0 1.01 2.00 2.97 3.91 4.84
0% 0 0.95 1.88 2.79 3.68 4.55
20% 0 0.96 1.90 2.81 3.70 4.58
40% 0 1.01 1.99 2.95 3.88 4.78
60% 0 1.08 2.13 3.14 4.13 5.09
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Table 13: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS with unitary notional with high-risk parameter
set for the counterparty and mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) for different
correlations among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I), and different fractions of variation
margin without initial margin. No margin period of risk. Symmetric funding rates (β− =
β+ = 1). Prices are in basis points.
Receiver, H/M, β− = β+ = 1
ρ¯ ↓ / α→ 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
-60% -30.90 -24.72 -18.54 -12.36 -6.18 0.00
-40% -19.82 -15.86 -11.89 -7.93 -3.96 0.00
-20% -10.07 -8.06 -6.04 -4.03 -2.01 0.00
0% -0.77 -0.62 -0.46 -0.31 -0.15 0.00
20% 8.22 6.58 4.93 3.29 1.64 0.00
40% 14.99 12.00 9.00 6.00 3.00 0,00
60% 21.39 17.11 12.83 8.56 4.28 0.00
Table 14: Prices of a ten-year payer IRS with unitary notional with high-risk parameter set for
the counterparty and mid-risk parameter set for the investor (”H/M“) for different correlations
among market and credit risks (ρ¯ = ρ¯C = ρ¯I), and different fractions of variation margin
without initial margin. No margin period of risk. Symmetric funding rates (β− = β+ = 1).
Prices are in basis points.
Payer, H/M, β− = β+ = 1
ρ¯ ↓ / α→ 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
-60% -20.52 -16.41 -12.31 -8.21 -4.10 0.00
-40% -29.40 -23.52 -17.64 -11.76 -5.88 0.00
-20% -38.18 -30.54 -22.91 -15.27 -7.64 0.00
0% -47.51 -38.01 -28.51 -19.00 -9.50 0.00
20% -56.69 -45.35 -34.01 -22.68 -11.34 0.00
40% -68.54 -54.84 -41.13 -27.42 -13.71 0.00
60% -80.06 -64.05 -48.03 -32.02 -16.01 0.00
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Table 15: Prices of a ten-year receiver IRS traded with a CCP (or bilaterally) with a mid-risk
parameter set for the clearing member (investor) and a high-risk parameter set for the client
(counterparty) for initial margin posted at various confidence levels q. Prices are calculated
from the point of view of the client (counterparty). Symmetric funding policy with β+ =
β− = 1. Correlation ρ¯ is zero. Prices in basis points with a notional of one Euro.
Receiver, CCP, β− = β+ = 1 Receiver, Bilateral, β− = β+ = 1
q CVA DVA MVA FVA CVA DVA MVA FVA
50.00% -0.1259 3.0798 0.0000 -0.1574 -2.1317 4.3477 0.0000 -0.0842
68.00% -0.0660 1.6046 -2.9332 0.1251 -1.1176 2.2613 -4.1389 0.2491
90.00% -0.0151 0.3566 -8.0373 0.5492 -0.2578 0.4997 -11.3410 0.7924
95.00% -0.0067 0.1540 -10.3158 0.7205 -0.1149 0.2151 -14.5561 1.0250
99.00% -0.0011 0.0249 -14.5898 1.0290 -0.0204 0.0346 -20.5869 1.4544
99.50% -0.0006 0.0127 -16.1545 1.1402 -0.0107 0.0176 -22.7947 1.6107
99.70% -0.0004 0.0083 -17.2329 1.2165 -0.0070 0.0114 -24.3164 1.7184
99.90% -0.0002 0.0042 -19.3806 1.3684 -0.0035 0.0056 -27.3469 1.9326
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